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**U.S. ARMY'S FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS FOR
ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS IN MILITARY
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

**MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies**

by

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**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

**U.S. ARMY'S FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING
EFFECTIVENESS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**
by MAJ David B. Snodgrass, USA, 87 pages.

This study examines force structure options available to the United States Army to improve performance of its units in military operations other than war (MOOTW) without jeopardizing those units ability to fight and win two near simultaneous major theater wars (MTW). The study begins by establishing the need for increased MOOTW competency based on recent historical trends, realistic assessments of future threats, and existing strategic guidance.

Subsequently, the study examines the impact of recent force structure decisions and their potential to enhance MOOTW effectiveness in future operations. The study analyzes possible options discussed in existing literature to determine if they meet screening criteria to maintain combat readiness, meet strategic guidance, and provide for worst-case scenarios.

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ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARNG	Army National Guard
AUSA	Association of the United States Army
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CA	Civil Affairs
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CS	Combat Support
CSIS	Center for International and Strategic Studies
CSS	Combat Service Support
CTC	Combat Training Center
FM	Field Manual
FY	Fiscal Year
GPO	Government Printing Office
HIMARS	High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
IBCT	Interim Brigade Combat Team
IO	Information Operations
JIT	Just in Time (Logistics)
JTF	Joint Task Force
<i>JV 2010</i>	<i>Joint Vision 2010</i>
METL	Mission Essential Task List

MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MP	Military Police
MRC	Major Regional Conflict
MTW	Major Theater War
NCA	National Command Authority
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NMS	<i>National Military Strategy</i>
NSS	<i>National Security Strategy</i>
OCAR	Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PERSTEMPO	Personnel Tempo
PSRC	Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
QDR	<i>Quadrennial Defense Review</i>
RC	Reserve Component
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SFOR	Stabilization Force (in Bosnia-Herzegovina)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSC	Smaller-Scale Contingencies
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command

UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (in Bosnia-Herzegovina)
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USFOR SOM	United States Forces in Somalia
USR	Unit Status Report
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Be not deceived and accept the foolish delusion . . . that the soldier's obligations only begin when summoned to meet a foreign enemy or to put down armed resistance which has overthrown civil power. . . . A soldier is now expected to exert himself within proper limits to preserve and organize peace. He should labor, in unison with the citizen and philanthropist, to impress and extend our civilization. So vast is the field of operations of our small army, and so scattered are the troops, it is possible, if not extremely probable, that in a few short years, whatever may be age and rank, you may be obliged to administer affairs wherein considerable knowledge of civil matters may be necessary. (Otis 1882)

As timely as these remarks seem, they were actually spoken to the West Point graduating class of 1882. Less than twenty years after the American Civil War, the United States Army in 1882 was trying to come to grips with the challenges inherent in performing missions that fell outside its traditional role of fighting and winning the nation's wars. Soldiers at that time found themselves involved in Reconstruction Era constabulary functions in the South, fighting Indian wars in the West, and performing nation-building activities. Concurrent with their newfound responsibilities, the army of that day saw vast reductions in manpower after the Civil War.

The challenges of today's Army are eerily similar and no less demanding than those faced by our predecessors over 100 years ago. From the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 until the end of FY 1998, the Army decreased in size from 732,403 to 484,000 (Caldera and Reimer 1999, 19). Despite this reduction in manpower of almost 34 percent, the Army has continued to deploy units on operational missions with a frequency at least equal to that of the Cold War era.

Like the Army into which the West Point class of 1882 was graduating, the Army of today stares out at a vastly different strategic landscape than that envisioned by its immediate predecessors. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the threat of a peer competitor in the immediate future has dissipated. The strength of America's two major regional threats, Iraq and North Korea, appears to be dissipating as well (Dubik 1999, 9). This revised threat assessment has allowed the Defense Department to reduce defense spending in the wake of the Cold War, resulting in a "peace dividend" in excess of \$750 billion (Caldera and Reimer 1999, 82).

Despite a reduced threat and a reduced budget, the Army's operational tempo has continued unabated. A recent effort by the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at the United States Army Command and General Staff College listed thirty-three named Army operations between 1989 and 1993 (Doyle and Lewis n.d., 1). Of these operations, all, with the exception of those associated with the war against Iraq, fall under the rubric of military operations other than war (MOOTW). Current Army doctrine (Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* 1993, 13-0. *See* Department of the Army. 1993) lists thirteen activities under the classification of MOOTW: noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids. Each of these activities will be defined as key terms later in this chapter.

MOOTW, of course, are not new to the Army. The Army has been conducting MOOTW at least as far back as the Whiskey Rebellion. During the Cold War, MOOTW

missions were frequent. Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan found an average of 7.2 incidents annually of what would now be classified as MOOTW between 1946 and 1975 (Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 26). Examples of MOOTW missions during the Cold War include, among many others, show of force (OPERATION GOLDEN PHEASANT in Honduras), support to counterinsurgency (El Salvador), counterdrug operations (Colombia), peace operations (Lebanon), and numerous examples of foreign internal defense, NEO, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

While MOOTW are not new, the current environment in which they are conducted has changed dramatically. Jennifer Taw and Alan Vick argue, for example, that recent peace operations have tended to be higher profile and involve greater number of conventional forces than other MOOTW such as counterinsurgency and counterdrug operations (Taw and Vick 1997, 184). The end of the superpower deadlock in the United Nations (UN) Security Council has led to a greater number of Chapter VII operations that require United States leadership and participation. The growth of news agencies and the electronic media have helped ensure that soldiers involved in MOOTW will be under constant scrutiny. These changes in the operational environment have caused Taw and Vick, among others, to openly suggest that the Army consider changes in force structure to enhance its effectiveness in MOOTW.

During the Cold War, MOOTW were generally considered “lesser included cases” for the purpose of force sizing (Taw and Vick 1997, 180). In other words, force planners believed a military optimized for major theater war could adapt to any lesser contingency. However, recent changes in the operational environment have caused many to question this assertion. Among the factors that are causing a re-evaluation of this Cold

War paradigm are the apparent lack of a peer competitor, the decreasing credibility of major regional threats, and the size, scope, and complexity of recent MOOTW missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

As General Douglas MacArthur once said, “And through all this welter of change and development, your mission remains fixed, inviolable. It is to win our nation’s wars” (MacArthur 1962). Few would argue with the undeniable logic of the general’s words. However, MacArthur, as the military governor of Japan after World War II, certainly recognized the requirement placed on the military to operate across the full spectrum of conflict, to include MOOTW. Thus, the ultimate challenge of the Army is to remain ready for major theater war while necessarily performing a myriad of tasks that are largely unrelated to traditional warfighting.

As the Army devotes more and more of its limited resources toward MOOTW, it continues to operate with the same type of force structure, albeit reduced, that existed at the height of the Cold War. The Army maintains six heavy divisions in its active component (AC) and four heavy divisions in the Army National Guard (ARNG). The Army has two light infantry divisions, one air assault division, and one airborne division. The National Guard (NG) maintains one light division, three divisions with a mix of heavy and light, and seven light, enhanced Separate Brigades.

The irony of the Army’s modern force structure is that it was designed for one set of tasks but has been used consistently during the Cold War and after to perform a wholly separate set. While soldiers and their leaders have shown considerable flexibility in adjusting to new missions, this new set of circumstances necessarily begs the question: What is the range of force structure options available that will allow the U.S. Army to

respond to MOOTW missions while maintaining its unquestioned ability to fight and win two near simultaneous major theater wars? This paper will examine options that various experts have proposed in an effort to determine which, if any, of those options can provide the next generation of Army leaders with the right tools to prepare for war and “MOOTW” with equal proficiency.

Relevance to Today's Army

This topic is of considerable importance to today's army. The dichotomy between increased deployments and fewer people appears to be taking its toll on morale and combat readiness. In a recent survey by the Army Research Institute, only 29 percent of officers and 21 percent of enlisted soldiers rated their unit morale as high or very high. On the question of combat readiness, only 56 percent of officers and 46 percent of enlisted soldiers described their unit as “well prepared” or “very well prepared” to perform its wartime duties. When asked why they might leave the service, officers listed “Amount of time separated from family” as the number one reason; enlisted soldiers listed it third (Naylor 1999, 10).

Another recent survey, conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), had similar findings. The study determined that “morale and readiness are suffering from force reductions, high operational tempo and resource constraints” (Collins 2000, 15). General Gordon R. Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the Army and current president of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), commenting on the survey, added: “The armed forces remain stretched and strained by repeated and intensive deployments on a host of missions from peacekeeping and peace enforcement

to humanitarian assistance that were never planned when the drawdown began or as it unfolded" (Association of the United States Army 2000, 8).

Recently, two Army divisions reported a "C4" on readiness, indicating that they were unprepared for their wartime missions. (Note: Under the Army's Unit Status Report (USR) procedures, units must report a readiness condition for major regional war between C1 (complete readiness) and C5 (unprepared). A rating of C4 would indicate that a unit requires additional manpower, equipment, or training before being able to fight in a major regional war.) The two divisions, the 10th Mountain Division (Light) and the First Infantry Division (Mechanized), were heavily involved in peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively. While a number of factors have contributed to the morale and readiness issues cited above, retired Colonel Don Snider, among others, believes that the overwhelming propensity to do more with less is one of the leading causes. In *Army Magazine*, he asserts:

The Army is employed in joint operations at an unsustainable operations tempo (OPTEMPO) that is hollowing out the force at an alarming rate, and will, if not retarded, preclude the Army from attracting and retaining the quality of personnel, particularly officers, that it needs over the multiple decades of this transition period. (Snider 1998, 14)

In addition to the impact on readiness and morale, the Army is coming under increasing criticism from within the civilian community and from within its own ranks for failing to adapt to the changing operational environment. A recent *Newsweek* article characterizes Army planners' emphasis on developing heavy forces at the expense of more mobile forces as "hidebound" and points out that threat assessments foresee future adversaries as having less than one-fifth of the armor faced by the United States in 1990 (Barry and Thomas 1999, 51). In the same article, Loren Thompson, head of the

Lexington Institute, accuses the Army of “looking backward” to find the threat.

Strategist Ralph Peters sums up this argument in an article for *Parameters*:

At the end of the day (and for countless days to come), this [MOOTW] will leave us with unwanted missions and an ill-matched military. Although our military leadership imagines it can change the mission, it would be far easier, and ultimately useful, to change the force to fit the times. (Peters 1999, 79)

Recent decisions to pursue the medium-weight brigades represent a departure from the “hidebound” mentality that critics say persists in the Army. The medium-weight brigade is not specifically designed to perform MOOTW missions. Yet, its increased mobility and flexibility may ultimately allow it to transition from traditional roles to MOOTW with less impact on combat readiness than current formations. While the medium brigade is a step towards a force optimized for MOOTW, the Army still has not publicly stated that it intends to create a force structure that is designed to perform MOOTW better and, in the process, address concerns of OPTEMPO, personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO), morale, and combat readiness.

This study *will* examine the options available to force planners to alter the current force structure to make units more MOOTW capable and yet still capable of performing their wartime tasks. The reason for this effort is that recent trends in the Army indicate that the current way of doing business is not good enough. The force tailored to fight the Cold War is now engulfed in MOOTW missions and is mired with potentially crippling diseases, ranging from recruiting problems to low retention rates of junior officers to a lack of confidence in combat readiness. Tailoring the force to meet the new operational environment may well provide the cure (or at least a good part of the cure) for these diseases.

Limitations and Delimitations

This study will be guided by a primary limitation. By stating this limitation, the goal is to maintain a focus on one specific aspect of MOOTW. For this reason, the paper is limited to addressing issues related to development of force structure for enhancing MOOTW effectiveness. Conversely, there are a number of MOOTW-related issues that the study is not about, though it will address some of these issues tangentially. These issues comprise the delimitations of this study.

This effort will have several delimitations. First, the study will not be able to address issues such as doctrine development, training, leadership development, maintenance, and support systems as they relate to MOOTW. Secondly, while the U.S. Army will seldom act as a single service or without its allies, this effort will not have sufficient scope to examine the implications of proposed changes on joint and combined operations. Third, the study will not specifically address the political considerations that lead to deployments for MOOTW, except as they relate to building force structure in accordance with strategic guidance.

Secondary Questions

Several secondary questions will derive from the primary question posed earlier in this chapter. In order to answer the primary question, these secondary questions will have to be answered. The first of these secondary questions will be: What is the likelihood that MOOTW missions will continue to play a prominent role in the *National Security Strategy (NSS)*? In order to answer this secondary question, research will focus on a series of theories postulated by futurists. The study will examine these theories for

patterns that may help predict the nature of modern war and the forces required to be successful in the future.

The second question will be: What is the relevance of optimizing force structure for MOOTW to the civilian leadership's guidance? To answer this question, the study will examine documents published by the civilian leadership (e.g., the *NSS* and *Shape, Respond Prepare Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era (NMS)*) to determine the role that MOOTW mission might have in shaping the international environment. The study will also focus on studies internal to the Department of Defense and the Army to determine the relevance of designing force structure optimized for MOOTW.

The third question will be: What is the possible impact of leading proposals for force structure changes on the Army's ability to perform MOOTW and MTW with equal effectiveness? The study will examine the most prominent proposals in the existing literature to determine how well they factor the necessity for MOOTW into their calculations. Specifically, the study will focus on a proposal for a brigade-based force, a proposal for a Peacekeeping Division or American Constabulary Force (ACF), and a proposal to retain more MOOTW intensive specialties (e.g., civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), military police (MP), and combat support (CS)) in the active component.

The fourth question will be: What lessons do past MOOTW missions hold for future changes in force structure? In answering this secondary question, the study will examine several case studies throughout the history of the Army. In an effort to determine the common characteristics of forces optimized for MOOTW, the study will examine MOOTW missions from the Reconstruction Era to Bosnia for lessons learned.

The outcomes of this examination will be central to the determination of decision criteria that can be used to evaluate the range of options during the research method application.

Key Terms

A number of doctrinal terms have already been used and will continue to be used throughout this research project. In order to clarify their usage, the terms will be defined as follows:

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) – Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. These operations may include counterdrug, counterinsurgency, domestic emergencies, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations. (FM 101-5-1, 1-100)

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) – Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve US citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. (FM 101-1-5, 1-110)

Arms Control – Arms control is a type of MOOTW that encompasses any plan, arrangement, or process controlling the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapons systems. (FM100-5, 13-5)

Support to Domestic Civil Authorities – A type of MOOTW in which appropriate governmental authority directs the armed forces to assist in domestic emergencies. Army units may support disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and other operations. Forces may also be used to suppress domestic violence or insurrection, but the Constitution and federal law restrict their use in this manner. (FM 100-5, 13-5)

Humanitarian Assistance – Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. (FM 101-5-1, 1-79)

Security Assistance – Group of programs authorized by statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (FM 100-5, 13-5)

Nation Assistance – Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (FM 101-5-1, 1-107)

Counterdrug – Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. (FM101-5-1, 1-40)

Combating Terrorism – A type of MOOTW that encompasses both anti-terrorism (passive measures aimed at prevention) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond terrorism). (FM 100-5, 13-6)

Peace Operations – A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. (FM 101-5-1, 1-120)

Peace Enforcement – Application of force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (FM 101-5-1, 1-119)

Peacekeeping – Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (FM 101-5-1, 1-119)

Show of Force – An operation, designed to demonstrate US resolve, that involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation, which, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. (FM 101-5-1, 1-140)

Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies – A type of MOOTW wherein U.S. military forces, at the direction of the NCA, assist either insurgent movements or host nation governments opposing an insurgency. (FM 100-5, 13-7)

Attacks and Raids – A type of MOOTW wherein the Army creates situations that permit seizing and maintaining political and military initiative. These operations also occur in war. (FM 100-5, 13-8)

Summary

Much like the Army about which Colonel Elwell Otis spoke over 118 years ago, the U.S. Army today is at a crossroads. With no peer competitor, the Army is focused on

shaping the international environment while it simultaneously prepares to stay combat ready for any future threat. Yet, this transition period has not proved to be a rest period. The Army is in a state of frustration due to a perceived gap between increased responsibilities abroad and dwindling resources at home. This state of frustration has contributed to problems in recruiting. New doubts have arisen over combat readiness. Confidence and unit morale, according to several studies, are in a state of decline.

Given that the number of MOOTW missions is unlikely to decline in the near future, the Army should consider changes in force structure that would enhance MOOTW capabilities, address morale concerns, and keep the force ready to fight and win two near simultaneous MTWs. This study will examine the existing body of literature regarding possible force structure changes to determine what range of options can best meet the criteria outlined above. Subsequently, this study will utilize a research method design whereby decision criteria can be utilized to determine the best option(s) available.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

As the introductory quote in chapter 1 indicates, strategists and military planners have been grappling with the issue of proper roles for the military for over a century. Not surprisingly, then, there is a wealth of existing literature regarding future force structure for the U.S. Army. In this chapter, the existing literature will be classified and reviewed in four classifications. These works will be introduced in order of logical partition.

First, the study will examine some of the leading works by futurists to determine what threats are likely to persist or emerge in the future, particularly with respect to MOOTW. Building upon this base of theory, the paper will examine documents from the National Command Authority (NCA), the Joint Staff, and the Army Headquarters to see how they relate to MOOTW. The next step in the logical partition is to examine the existing literature on proposals in the field to create different or new force structure. The paper will examine these proposals to determine how they plan to optimize forces for MOOTW missions. Finally, the paper will examine historical literature to determine common patterns that have determined success or failure in MOOTW missions.

What Does the Future Hold?

When the Berlin Wall was falling, in November of 1989, I happened to be in Kosovo, covering a riot between Serbs and Albanians. The future was in Kosovo, I told myself that night, not in Berlin. The same day that Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat clasped hands on the White House lawn, my Air Afrique plane was approaching Bamako, Mali, revealing corrugated-zinc shacks at the edge of an expanding desert. The real news wasn't at the White House, I realized. It was right below. (Kaplan 1994, 76)

A review of some of the leading theorists on the future might well be a depressing exercise. Many of the most renowned futurists are far from optimistic about what the

future holds. Collectively, they predict a world beset by tribal and ethnic strife, a struggle over resources, growing tension between rich and poor, and cultural animosity. This study will examine the views of Robert Kaplan, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Samuel Huntington, and Benjamin Barber.

Robert Kaplan, in an article for *Atlantic Monthly* entitled “The Coming Anarchy,” predicts a world where nation-states will begin to fail due to an inability to govern their people. He sees the environment as the enemy and notes that populations are growing in the precise areas where the environment cannot support them. A second trend he predicts is a growing increase in cultural and tribal warfare, exacerbated by geographical boundaries that ignore realities of culture. This is particularly evident in Africa.

Perhaps most alarmingly, he predicts that, as nation-states deteriorate, war and crime will eventually become indistinguishable. Combatants in the future will only show loyalty to their tribe or ethnic group, leading to interminable conflicts. Kaplan points to the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995 as a model for future conflict. He further predicts that soldiers from multiethnic Western societies will be ill prepared to deal with the “anarchy” that will await them should they try to intervene. He points to Haiti and Somalia as examples of where Western societies tried and failed to understand the nature of tribal violence and hatred. According to Kaplan, “In places where Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence” (1994, 72).

Alvin and Heidi Toffler foresee a world divided into three economic tiers or waves. The first wave represents agrarian societies that rely on manual labor. The second wave represents the industrial revolution, and the third wave represents the

information age. These waves of revolution, according to the Tofflers, have determined and will determine how wars are fought. During the first wave, victory in war meant massing more people than the enemy and achieving superior organization. During the second wave, victory depended on being able to produce materiel with greater speed and efficiency than the enemy. The Tofflers predict that victory in future wars will depend on obtaining dominance over the enemy by finding new ways to exploit information.

The Tofflers conclude by stating:

The historic change from a bisected to a trisected world could well trigger the deepest power struggles on the planet as each country tries to position itself in the emerging three-tiered power structure in which most wars from now on will be fought. And those wars will be different from those most of us imagine. (Toffler and Toffler 1993, 25)

One of the main implications of the Tofflers theory is that second and third wave cultures will attempt to use asymmetric means to challenge the New World Order. This possibility suggests that the United States must be prepared to cope with these asymmetric threats that could manifest themselves in a number of ways to include terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destructions (WMD), and information operations (IO).

A third renowned theorist, Samuel Huntington, predicts what he calls “a clash of civilizations.” Huntington’s article, when published in *Foreign Affairs*, generated more discussion, according to the editors, than any article since the 1940s. His thesis is that “the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (Huntington 1993, 22). He predicts that the wars of the future will occur along cultural fault lines where two or more civilizations meet. He cites the former Yugoslavia as example of the potential for crisis in an area where civilizations intermingle along

cultural fault lines (Huntington 1996, 138). Huntington warns that similar unrest is possible in several other “torn countries,” to include Russia, Turkey, and Mexico (136).

He predicts another phenomenon he calls “The West vs. the Rest” that he believes will inevitably take place because of the Western countries current dominance in world affairs. This is a view shared by a fellow writer Benjamin Barber in *Jihad vs. McWorld*, wherein the author predicts that democracy may well come under at two-pronged attack by the forces of global capitalism, on one hand, and by religious, tribal, and ethnic zealots, on the other. Huntington concludes his article by asserting that the West must identify “elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations” in order to peacefully coexist with the rest of the world (1993, 49). Table 1 shows the relationship between the different authors.

Professor Ian Roxborough and Lieutenant Colonel Dana Eyre synthesize diverging views of the nature of future warfare in an article entitled “Which Way to the Future?” In this article, the authors identify four types of warfare that are likely in the future. Each type will have implications for future force structure and planning. Roxborough and Eyre warn that future force planners should not become fixated on only one view of the future. Instead, they “should recognize that multiple futures are possible and likely to occur simultaneously” (1999, 28).

The first type of warfare they identify is systemic war, a war fought with missiles, precision-guided munitions, and space-based assets (29). The second type of likely future warfare is cyberwar, conducted by combatants (i.e., hackers) at computer terminals (29). The third type of likely future warfare is peacewar that would resemble recent peace operations (30). The fourth type of likely future warfare is dirty war in which U.S.

forces would have to contend with nonstate actors and failed states (30). The authors believe that future force structure needs to be designed to fight all four types of future war with equal effectiveness.

TABLE 1

RELATIONSHIP OF FUTURISTS' THEORIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FORCE STRUCTURE

	Primary Source of Future Conflicts	Likely Result	Implications for Force Structure	Possible MOOTW Tasks
Kaplan	Failed States; Struggle for Scarce Resources; Ethnic and Tribal Violence	War and Crime become indistinguishable.	More "Kosovo" type missions. Focus on peace operations	-Peace Operations -Hum. Assistance -Support for Insurgency and Counter-insurgency -Nation Assistance
Tofflers	Clash between Third Wave and First and Second Wave Cultures	Poorer countries will attempt to challenge the dominance of third wave societies. Asymmetric threats may emerge.	Focus on information dominance; maintain technical edge; be prepared for asymmetric threats.	-Combating Terrorism -Arms Control
Huntington	Cultural clashes between seven or eight distinct civilizations.	Cultural war in "torn countries" situated on fault lines (e.g., Mexico, Turkey, Russia).	Identify common interests to eliminate threats. Focus on combating terrorism.	-Security Assistance -Combating Terrorism -Nation Assistance -Arms Control

Taken in sum total, the views of these leading theorists have enormous implications for force planning. At least in the case of Kaplan, Huntington, and Barber, it would appear that forces will be needed to help shape the international environment in operations that fall short of war. In addition to the cultural clashes and the competition for resources that the authors have highlighted, it can be assumed that natural and man-made disasters will also complicate the international security environment. In short, the U.S. Army can count on being involved in many conflicts similar to the ones performed in the recent past.

Guidance from Higher

The second classification of literature related to this topic is contained in guidance from the NCA and the Joint Staff. The two primary documents that direct the efforts of the Army are the *NSS* and the *NMS*. Recent efforts to visualize the future battlefield and defense requirements have resulted in two other important publications: *Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010)* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*. The relationship of these documents to future force structure, particularly with respect to MOOTW missions, is the subject of the next phase of literature review.

The *NSS* has three core objectives. These objectives are to enhance national security, to bolster economic prosperity, and to promote democracy abroad (Clinton, 1998, iii). The *NSS* differentiates between peacetime engagement activities, smaller-scale contingencies (SSC) and MTW. The *NSS* points out that the measure of success of the military is to be able to fight and win two near simultaneous MTWs. The *NSS* states that this capability is central to deter “opportunism elsewhere,” while the military is

engaged in one MTW or conducting SSC or peacetime engagements activities in other theaters.

Perhaps the most relevant portion of the *NSS* to this study is that portion where it discusses risk. The *NSS* states: “Ultimately, however, the United States must accept a degree of risk associated with withdrawing from contingency operations and engagement activities in order to reduce the greater risk incurred if we failed to respond adequately to major theater wars” (1998, 22). It is this idea of risk and how to measure it that leaves the *NSS* open to some criticism, as subsequent review of literature will point out. These issues will be discussed later in the third classification of literature related to MOOTW and force structure.

The *NMS* outlines three imperatives for implementing the *NSS*. The first of these three imperatives is shaping the international environment through deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation and leadership in alliances. The second of these imperatives is responding to the full spectrum of crises from humanitarian assistance to major theater war. The third of these three imperatives is to prepare now for an uncertain future by investing in modernization that exploits the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (*NMS*, 3,4).

MOOTW missions are part of the strategy of shaping the international environment to build constructive relationships that will keep some countries from becoming adversaries in the future. While some critics may see many MOOTW missions as “optional,” others would argue that they are a short-term investment in national security that will prevent the United States from paying a larger cost in the future. The *NMS* clearly states that the military’s focus must remain on winning the nation’s wars,

but it is also necessary to devote resources to the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace.

Joint Vision 2010 states that the primary task of the armed forces is “to deter conflict--but should deterrence fail, to fight and win our nation’s wars” (1996, 4). The document also points out that: “We should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent, conflict prevention, and peacetime activities (4).” *JV 2010* outlines four operation concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. These concepts are intended to provide “full spectrum dominance” over any opponent.

All of the documents described above pay some attention to the type of threats outlined by the preeminent futurists discussed earlier. There is emphasis, for example, on counterterrorism (Barber, Huntington), informational dominance (Tofflers), and responding to asymmetrical threats (Kaplan). A review of these documents, then, highlight several points that are central to the primary question posed by this research project. First, any consideration of change in force structure must keep in mind the ultimate goal--be able to fight and win two MTWs. The second key point brought out in these national level documents is that MOOTW missions will continue to be necessary as part of the United States Armed Forces strategy of shaping the international environment to deter war and promote peace.

Range of Options on the Table

The existing literature on proposed force structure changes provides a wide variety of possible options for Army decision makers. This paper will examine those concepts that have received the most attention by experts on military force structure.

Among those who believe that changes are required, four schools of thought have emerged. Shortly after the author began researching this topic, the Army embarked on a course to create two initial medium-weight brigades. Supporters of this concept believe that the lighter, more rapidly deployable medium brigades will be able to give the Army more options for SSCs, to include MOOTW. Another school of thought supports a shift to a brigade-based concept that would require the Army to organize military missions around brigades with specific capabilities rather than around divisions. The third school of thought supports creation of a division-size force (sometimes referred to as an “American Constabulary Force”) that would be tailored to fight solely in MOOTW environments. The fourth school of thought supports a realignment of active and reserve units to provide active duty commanders with forces in the active component that are critical to success in MOOTW environments (e.g., MPs, CA, PSYOP, and heavy engineer units).

Medium-Weight Forces

The concept for medium-weight forces arose out of a perceived necessity to be able to respond quickly to SSCs, to include MOOTW. Proponents of medium-weight forces believe that light infantry forces may lack lethality and force protection capability in future SSCs. Heavy armored formations, on the other hand, lack the ability to deploy rapidly because of the enormous amount of lift assets required to deploy them. Medium-weight forces, the proponents argue, would be able to bridge the gap between light forces that lack firepower and heavy forces that lack agility.

Two leading proponents of medium-weight forces are John Gordon and Peter Wilson of the U.S. Army War College. In 1998, they published a short study, sponsored

by the Strategic Studies Institute, entitled "The Case for Army XXI 'Medium-Weight' Aero-motorized Divisions: A Pathway to the Army of 2020." They envisioned a medium-weight force that would take advantage of new technological advances in order to become more rapidly deployable, while possessing greater firepower, survivability, and mobility than traditional light infantry. The force they proposed would possess the versatility to be used either in MOOTW or as the initial land force in a major theater war that could be augmented later by heavy armored forces.

The new experimental brigades at Fort Lewis seem to be in general consonance with the model offered by Gordon and Wilson. The initial concept calls for a brigade combat team of approximately 3,500 soldiers that would be able to deploy to trouble spots within ninety-six hours. The brigades would use medium-weight, armored vehicles that could be transported four to six at a time in C-17 or C-5 aircraft (Naylor 1999, 12).

The Brigade-Based Army Concept

Recent experiences indicate that task forces deployed for MOOTW missions have been characterized by ad hoc organizational relationships. For example, the American contingent in the United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II was an ad hoc group composed of Special Operations Forces (Task Force Ranger) and conventional forces from the 10th Mountain Division (Light). The commander of United States Forces Somalia (USFORSCOM), Lieutenant General Thomas Montgomery, did not possess command authority over TF Ranger and did not have a habitual relationship with either unit. Adding to this complexity is the multinational aspect of many peace operations. In Bosnia, for example, Major General Bill Nash was responsible for command and control of five maneuver brigades, only two of which were American.

Many writers on the issue of force structure believe that the complexities of preparing for MOOTW missions can be reduced by taking a holistic approach to make the Army a simpler organization based on maneuver brigades task organized during peacetime as they would be for war or MOOTW. The person most generally associated with this view is Colonel Douglas Macgregor, author of *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*. Macgregor argues for a “smarter, smaller, faster, and more technologically advanced warfighting organization” that would be more self-sufficient than current brigades and designed to operate as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF).

Macgregor contends that his more robust “brigade groups” working directly for a Corps headquarters could be kept ready for deployment on a rotating basis. He gives an example of an airborne – air assault group tailored for a MOOTW mission; this new organization, he believes, by eliminating division headquarters, would be more flexible and responsive. Because it is designed to operate as part of a JTF, it would be able to deploy under a Corps JTF headquarters with which it has a habitual working relationship. This arrangement might eliminate some of the ad hoc qualities that have characterized past deployments for MOOTW. It appears, as more is becoming known about the medium brigade experiment at Fort Lewis, that some of Macgregor’s concepts are being implemented into the two new brigades.

Macgregor’s concept comes under some criticism for its proposal to do away with division-level headquarters. Colonel David Fastabend questions whether a Corps or JTF Commander would be able to effectively command and control six brigade groups and an armored cavalry regiment:

A two-tiered force structure of brigades and corps implies that the theater communications zone begins at the brigade rear boundary. The corps commander gets to do it all: fight the tactical and work all logistical support all the way back to the United States. In his spare time, he takes care of allied or coalition concerns, the interagency process, and his Army component responsibilities to the CINC and the other services. (Fastabend, 1997, 78)

Finally, it must be pointed out that Macgregor's proposal for a brigade-based force is predicated on preparing for future war at the high end of the conflict spectrum. The emphasis on leveraging information age technology and organizing within the trend lines of the RMA is likely to have limited utility in improving units' effectiveness in MOOTW. However, other concepts he proposes are, in fact, likely to contribute to a discussion on how to conduct MOOTW more effectively (for example, streamlining organizations and reducing ad hoc command relationships).

The Army Constabulary Force Concept

Another idea that has gained some currency during recent debates about force structure is the concept of a separate force designed solely for peacekeeping. While peacekeeping is only one aspect of MOOTW, it is the MOOTW mission that has typically provided the largest single drain on manpower. Among advocates for this separate force are retired officers Bob Adolph, Don Snider, and George Wilson. The central theme of their argument is that a force tailored for peacekeeping would be able to perform that role better than forces tailored for the high end of the combat spectrum. Also, the creation of a separate force for peacekeeping would allow combat forces to focus more on training for MTW and reduce the risks associated with the two MTW scenario (see earlier discussion of NSS).

Snider would prefer to call this new force the American constabulary force (ACF) while Adolph would prefer to call it a peacekeeping division. Regardless of what the force would be called, their separate proposals would have many of the same features. Some features of the proposed ACF, taken from the article by Adolph (1999, 50) but similar to other proposals, would be:

1. A five-brigade structure to allow for predictability in the soldiers' lives
2. Beefed-up Civil Affairs for local liaison and support to the international humanitarian aid community
3. Psychological Operations for the creation of mine awareness and public information campaigns
4. Aviation and transport for moving humanitarian aid items and refugees
5. Robust medical support for the treatment of exotic diseases and mine injuries
6. Engineers for mine clearance and bridge building
7. Military police for the manning of checkpoints and crowd control

(1999, 50)

The ACF would be given tailored training in rules of engagement (ROE), foreign languages, area studies, the discriminate use of force, and local customs. Proponents of this concept believe it would aid in recruiting because it would appeal to the idealism of American youth. Snider believes that this initiative might create a regional constituency in Congress (around the installation where the new force would be based) and give the Army greater justification to seek and receive a larger share of the defense budget.

It should be noted that both of these concepts have their detractors. Many are unwilling to abandon the divisional structure that has historically served the Army well. Colonel David Fastabend, for example, in an article for *Parameters*, supports the idea of a brigade-based force; but he also calls for maintaining a division headquarters to enhance command and control. He points to after-action reports from World War II that

roundly criticize the “pooling” concept that stripped Army divisions down to a bare minimum and pooled assets at corps and army level (1997, 74).

A second criticism of the proposed force is that it is likely to be isolated from the rest of the army--looked upon with disdain by those who consider themselves the “true” warfighters. With a separate and distinct mission from the rest of the Army, the force might well become a pariah force. Fastabend suggests that the proposed force could be nicknamed “The State Department’s Own,” implying that the creation of such a force would only make civilian leaders more willing to devote Army forces to MOOTW than ever before (1998, 8).

However, the biggest criticism of the ACF is that, as a less lethal force, it may not possess the firepower, lethality, or combat skills required to transition to combat operations if a MOOTW situation were to suddenly escalate. Retired Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie, former Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia, insists that combat forces are the right forces, at least for peace enforcement missions:

Combat forces are the right forces for PE missions. The signal that is sent when your credential are the materials of war is a powerful motivator of compliance. This opinion was shared by at least one Bosnian corps commander who, when pointing to 4,500 of his troops in formation, stated: “All my men out there are fighters, not yet soldiers. You Americans are soldiers. You all dress alike, you all have discipline, you have clean weapons at the ready, you always travel in four vehicle convoys, even your helicopters fly in formation. Soldiers do that and we notice it. (1997, 71)

Realignment of Active and Reserve Units

While the brigade-based Army and the ACF concept represent holistic approaches that would completely change the way the Army fights and conducts MOOTW, some

experts on force planning merely advocate an overhaul of the current force structure. One of the foremost advocates of this approach is William T. Johnsen of the Strategic Studies Institute. In a monograph entitled "Force Planning Considerations for Army XXI," Johnsen recommends changing the Army's current mix of combat, CS, and CSS units within the AC and between the Active and Reserve Components. He foresees a greater need for CS and CSS units to support "more frequent and prolonged smaller-scale contingencies and shaping operations" (1998, 35). He also foresees the RC, particularly the ARNG, having to convert heavy combat formations to CS and CSS to meet the anticipated increase in SSC and shaping operations.

Recent experiences in MOOTW missions provide the impetus for Johnsen's recommendations. He points out that units with a dual military-civil application (e.g., MP, CA, PSYOP, engineers, aviation, and all forms of logistical support) will continue to be in high demand for MOOTW missions (27). He also argues that the increase in stability operations may require increases in the number of special operations forces (SOF). SOF are particularly valuable in stability operations because of their language capability, regional expertise, and knowledge of local customs and cultures (28).

Jennifer M. Taw and Michael Vick echo many of these same arguments in an article for *Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century*. The authors point out that the Army has already begun to improve its MOOTW capabilities by increasing education and training at combat training centers (CTCs), reassessing equipment requirements, and experimenting with new force packages. However, they suggest that the Army may need to consider more radical changes in force structure. Specifically, they point out that those units in greatest demand for MOOTW missions often are assigned at echelons above

division and may not be readily available. When they are allocated to the brigade or division, they are frequently not employed in accordance with their capabilities because commanders at those levels lack experience in dealing with these assets.

Taw and Vick go into greater detail on the issue of Reserve Component support of MOOTW than Johnsen. They point out that without a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up (PSRC), only volunteers will augment the limited assets that exist in the AC for CS/CSS, PSYOP, and CA. In the case of Somalia, where there was no PSRC, CA personnel were plentiful, but did not possess the “most useful combination of skills and capabilities” (189). Furthermore, there is increasing concern that repeated activation of reservists may lead to a drop in their recruitment and retention. The authors point out that some of the personnel most needed in MOOTW (e.g., doctors and CA personnel) tend to be those who will be most hurt professionally by repeated call-ups. (190)

Other Options

Thus far, the literature review has focused on four options that have been written about extensively; the review has also cited the works of some of the leading advocates of these options. In subsequent chapters, this study will examine whether or not these options can be combined or modified to create another range of options worthy of recommendation. As British historian Michael Howard and others have observed, force planning in a time of peace is perhaps more of a journey than a destination. With this thought in mind, the paper will attempt to identify the best and worst aspects of existing proposals in an effort to find the best way forward. To this end, it may be necessary to modify proposals in the existing literature or create new proposals based on historical lessons learned.

Historical Lessons Learned with Respect to MOOTW

The final portion of the literature review will focus on lessons learned from history that may be useful in determining decision criteria for the research methodology to be used in chapter 3. Many of the viewpoints expressed by the authors previously reviewed reflect historical lessons learned. For example, the importance of civil affairs and psychological operations in many MOOTW missions, particularly peace operations, is well documented by Taw and Vick, as well as by William Johnsen. As Johnsen points out:


SOF units, such as PSYOPS (sic), civil affairs, and special forces units bring unique and highly useful capabilities to shaping activities. Similarly, SOF personnel possess language skills, regional expertise, and knowledge of local customs and cultures that are invaluable in a wide variety of missions falling under the shaping umbrella. Moreover, such units and personnel reinforce and complement skills needed to deter and compel. (1997, 28)

In addition to these historically sound arguments, the literature review will examine the history of MOOTW missions to determine what lessons learned, if any, will have an impact on future force structure.

Most historians would agree that the large number of MOOTW tasks since 1989 does not represent a departure from historical trends. While it may feel as though the Army is currently being overwhelmed by MOOTW commitments, this level of commitment in MOOTW is relatively common to the Army's experience. After the Civil War, for example, the American Army had extensive constabulary duties in the South during the Reconstruction Era. The Frontier Army of the late nineteenth century was, likewise, extremely busy maintaining order on the frontier and fighting a series of small engagements with Native American Indians. In the two decades after the Spanish-

American War, Army forces were extremely busy keeping order in such sensitive areas as the Philippines and the Caribbean Basin.

US MILITARY OPERATIONS



Note: This chart is by no means a comprehensive rendering of nontraditional operations.

Figure 1. US Military Operations. Reprinted from Dr. Lawrence A. Yates. "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns, and Themes," *Military Review* 76, no. 4 (July-August 1997): 52.

Dr. Yates points out the extent to which nontraditional military operations have occupied the attention of the United States Army over its history. In the article "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns, and Themes," he states:

That US officers often find themselves adrift in such operations is not without a touch of irony in that these undertakings are nothing new; they have not been spawned or even accelerated, as some commentary would suggest, by the

post-Cold War environment. Rather, the US military has engaged in these nontraditional, unorthodox operations throughout its history, far more often than it has waged conventional warfare. (1997, 51)

The chart included in his article, figure 1, clearly demonstrates the preponderance of nontraditional military operations throughout the Army's history.

Many lessons were gleaned from these experiences that have relevance to this study. A study in 1969 by the Office of Naval Research of five overseas constabulary operations by United States forces identified four areas that were critical to success in future constabulary operations. These were doctrine development, specialized training in area culture and language, development of personnel with special capabilities for constabulary-type operations, and development of updated information on overseas areas. (Havron et al. 1969, vii) From a force structure perspective, these four points might underscore the importance of maintaining a robust SOF community for MOOTW.

More recent experiences reinforce other lessons as well. Experiences in Bosnia, for example, underscore the significance of having a credible combat capability. As Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Wesley Clark said, “[NATO forces in Bosnia] are effective peacekeepers precisely because they have . . . warfighting skills and are known to have them” (Arbona 1998, 14).

Somalia taught the Army a number of lessons on several issues: force protection, exit strategy, unity of command, mission creep, and integrating political, military, and humanitarian objectives. Colonel Dan Bolger points to a “fouled chain of command, overreliance on provisional units, and a misplaced contempt for SNA capabilities” as the most profound military mistakes in that operation (1995, 329). Of particular importance from a force structure standpoint, however, is the advisability of task organizing some

combined arms capability with peacekeeping task forces and the importance, once again, of responsive PSYOP and CA personnel.

Perhaps the most important lesson of recent MOOTW experiences is that units will need to be capable of performing a myriad of tasks effectively. Many of the soldiers that pass out food rations during the day may be required to conduct combat patrols that night. In operations ranging from disaster relief (e.g., Hurricane Andrew) to humanitarian assistance (e.g., Somalia) to peace enforcement (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo), the need for flexibility on the part of soldiers and their units has been paramount. Any proposed force structure changes should recognize this inherent need to enhance the flexibility of units participating in MOOTW. In other words, unit capabilities should be enhanced to allow them to operate along the full spectrum of conflict with equal effectiveness.

Summary

This review of literature related to MOOTW and force structure has identified four classifications of literature to be used in research in subsequent chapters: future theories relating to MOOTW, national command level guidance for MOOTW, the range of options available to improve force structure for MOOTW, and historical lessons learned. In the following chapter, theories about future warfare and national guidance will be used to determine screening criteria for assessing the range of options available. Historical lessons learned will be used to determine decision criteria for selecting the best options available. In chapters 4 and 5, these decision criteria will be applied to determine and recommend the best possible range of options for force structure optimized for MOOTW missions that leave the Army with the unquestioned ability to fight and win two MTWs.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The method of research for this study will be qualitative in nature. The study will focus on collecting data from a variety of sources that do not lend themselves to empirical methods. The primary and secondary sources used in this study become the data that are to be interpreted. The data will then be analyzed by applying various forms of criticism. The study will analyze the motives behind each source, the relationship of the materials to one another, and the valid conclusions that can be drawn from them. Based on an informed understanding of the materials and balanced against verifiable facts and conclusions, the author will organize the results of the study and present the conclusions in an organized form.

This study will follow a research model offered in Gary Moore's *Developing and Evaluating Educational Research*. This model consists of six steps:

1. Identification and isolation of the problem
2. Development of a hypothesis
3. Collection and classification of source materials, including a determination of the facts through the application of various forms of criticism
4. Organization of the facts into results
5. Formation of conclusions
6. Synthesis and presentation in an organized form

Step 1: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

The research question was formulated in response to a series of articles asserting that operational tempo as a result of MOOTW missions were having a deleterious effect

on combat readiness in the Army. From the thesis research, it became clear that soldiers were not the problem. By almost all accounts, American soldiers had performed superbly, with some exceptions. The research tried to identify what particular aspect of MOOTW the Army could do better in its efforts to solve some of the OPTEMPO problems. In solving the OPTEMPO problems, attendant issues of combat readiness, morale, recruitment, and retention would also be addressed.

For several reasons, this topic is one of immense significance to the Army as it transitions from the Cold War to the new and challenging post-Cold War era. The first reason is that missions like the ones in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti do not appear to be going away in the near future. They have become very much a part of what the *NMS* calls “shaping the international environment.” The second reason is that the Army must improve its MOOTW capability in such a way that it does not degrade its ability to conduct MTW. The Army must shift away from the paradigm that it can only do one or the other. This point becomes mute when the NCA directs the military to do both. The greater call of the Army is to serve the nation. Thus, it must learn to prepare for and conduct MTW and MOOTW with equal effectiveness.

Force structure was isolated from other key aspects, including doctrine and training development, of improving MOOTW capability. This was done to delimit the topic and narrow the scope of the study. The question of force structure related to MOOTW has larger implications because it will ultimately become a central part of the debate over force structure as a whole. This research project will contribute to the debate about how the Army can best organize to meet MacArthur’s dictum to fight and win the

nation's wars while simultaneously shaping the international environment to prevent wars and promote peace.

Step 2: Development of a Hypothesis

After isolating the problem, the research question was developed. The research question is: How can the U.S. Army optimize future force structure for MOOTW while still retaining the ability to fight and win two near simultaneous MTW? This question takes several factors into account. First of all, the research question recognizes the fact that MOOTW has always been an important part of the Army's service to the nation, but that the Army must learn to do it better. At the same time, the question recognizes the importance of maintaining MTW capability in the process.

The underlying hypothesis is that changes in force structure can reduce the deleterious effects of frequent deployments on combat readiness and morale by optimizing capabilities and reducing some of the ad hoc qualities that have characterized past missions. With this hypothesis in mind, the next step is to collect and classify sources that offer a range of options for how the Army can, in fact, optimize the force for MOOTW. To test the hypothesis, the paper will apply the qualitative analysis to these sources to determine what range of options is most likely to provide the best results for the Army.

Step 3: Collection and Classification of Sources

The collection of sources is described in detail in chapter 2. For the purpose of research, these sources have been classified into four groups. The first group of sources is theoretical. These include the works of Kaplan, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Benjamin Barber, and Samuel Huntington, among others. In selecting these sources, special

consideration was given to the standing of the writers in their field. Those authors cited are some of the most widely read in the field of futuristic theory. By analyzing several, it gives the research a broader base upon which to view possible future threats.

The second group of works is composed of documents that outline national security and defense strategies. These works focus on the strategy of the United States to shape the international environment, respond to crises, and prepare now for an uncertain future. This group of works is important to the research because they provide the parameters within which any changes must take place. In other words, they provide the screening criteria for the elimination of options. If a range of options does not meet the strategic guidance set forth in these documents, then those options cannot be considered viable.

The third group of works combines theoretical and organizational literature. These works provide many of the theories that will be tested in later steps of the qualitative analysis. Once again, the reputation of the authors has been taken into account. The authors cited have conducted extensive research on the issue of force structure and/or bring years of experience to the arguments they provide. Sources that show a particular bias toward one point of view or the other have been avoided.

The fourth group of works is composed of historical references that outline lessons learned in recent MOOTW missions. These historical documents provide the research with ideas of what has worked and what has not worked in past MOOTW missions. From these works, decision criteria will be determined for evaluating the possible range of options to improve MOOTW capability. The reputation and experience level of the writers was the primary consideration in the selection of these works. A

variety of operations over extended periods of time have been examined in order to determine timeless principles that should be considered in the development of decision criteria.

Step 4: Organization of Facts into Results

The fourth step of the qualitative model is the organization of facts into results. In this step, facts will be gathered from the sources collected to determine relationships between those facts. The relationships will then yield results that will help determine conclusions. For example, if one source offers an option for force structure, but a preponderance of other sources refutes the efficacy of that option, the research will have established a relationship that can yield a conclusion. Another way of establishing a relationship is to find a historical example of where certain ranges of options have been tried and to analyze the outcome of those previous experiences.

Instruments to be Used

Several instruments will be used in the organization of facts into results. The first instrument that will be applied to a particular range of options is screening criteria. This qualitative analysis will apply the following screening criteria against any range of options:

1. Will this option degrade the ability of the force to fight and win two near simultaneous MTW?
2. Will this option fail to address the worse case scenarios offered by Kaplan, Toffler, Huntington, and Barber?
3. Will this option fail to meet strategic guidance as outlined in the NSS, the NMS, and JV 2010?

If the answer of any of those questions is yes, then that range of options will not be considered viable and will be eliminated.

The second instrument this study will use is decision criteria. Each range of options will be evaluated using the following three decision criteria:

1. Political Viability: Will this option be politically acceptable? This criterion will be assigned a value based on whether political support for a certain option is considered to be (1) very likely, (2) likely, or (3) not likely.

2. Effect on OPTEMPO: Will this option be able to reduce the deleterious effects of frequent deployments on combat readiness and morale? This criterion will be assigned a value based on whether a certain option is considered (1) very likely to reduce OPTEMPO, (2) likely to reduce OPTEMPO, or (3) not likely to reduce OPTEMPO.

3. Flexibility: William Johnsen of the Strategic Studies Institute considers flexibility, along with versatility and adaptability, as the critical considerations in force planning (Johnsen 1997, 34). Flexibility, in the context of MOOTW, can be defined as the ability to conduct missions across the entire range of the conflict spectrum. This criterion will be assigned a value based on whether a certain option will (1) significantly enhance flexibility, (2) marginally enhance flexibility, or (3) not provide for greater flexibility.

Table 2 depicts a “shell” of a decision matrix for organizing facts into results.

Step 5: Formation of Conclusions

This table also demonstrates the process that will be used to form conclusions based on the facts derived from various sources in steps 3 and 4. Each range of options will be analyzed using the screening criteria and decision criteria outlined in step 4.

Conclusions will be based on the credibility and weight of supporting evidence in the existing literature. The values have been assigned so that lower totals are preferred. The best option will be the one with the lowest total.

TABLE 2
DECISION MATRIX SHELL FOR FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS

	Political Viability	Effect on OPTEMPO	Flexibility	Total
Option 1: Brigade-Based Force	1-Support very likely 2-Support likely 3-Support not likely	1-Very Likely to reduce 2- Likely to reduce 3- Not likely to reduce	1-Significantly enhance 2-Marginally enhance 3-Not enhance	?
Option 2: ACF	1- Support very likely 2- Support likely 3- Support not likely	1-Very Likely to reduce 2- Likely to reduce 3- Not likely to reduce	1-Significantly enhance 2-Marginally enhance 3-Not enhance	?
Option 3: Change Active-Reserve Balance	1- Support very likely 2- Support likely 3- Support not likely	1-Very Likely to reduce 2- Likely to reduce 3- Not likely to reduce	1-Significantly enhance 2-Marginally enhance 3-Not enhance	?

Note: Lower totals are preferred.

Step 6: Synthesis and Presentation in an Organized Form

The discussion of conclusions will be presented in a topic outline format. The topic outline will be roughly analogous to the familiar military decision making process, appropriate for the audience. The outline will discuss each option as a course of action. The discussion will center on the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action.

Each course of action will then be evaluated on whether or not it meets the screening criteria discussed earlier. If a course of action fails to meet the screening criteria, it will be eliminated from consideration. Finally, each course of action will be evaluated using the decision criteria. The course of action that comes closest to meeting all three criteria will become the recommended course of action.

The Case for Refining Options

The study will also try to determine the feasibility of combining certain aspects of different courses of action to create an optimal solution. Using the analogy of the military decision-making process, this approach will combine aspects of more than one course of action. This analysis will take place over the course of about two months and will not use any classified material. The larger implication of this study is that it will provide a vehicle for studying force structure with particular emphasis on MOOTW. This is an important implication due to the inescapable reality that these missions will continue to demand an enormous share of the Army's resources.

An old maxim hypothesizes that an individual can eat an elephant if he takes one small bite at a time. MOOTW and the attendant demand on resources have become the proverbial elephant in the Army today--a plate so full that one could never hope to digest it all. This study will hopefully be able to provide valuable insights to the greater community on how the Army can learn to eat the elephant that MOOTW has become a bite at a time through a more enlightened approach to force structure.

In the next chapter, the research design that has been outlined in the preceding pages will be applied. While the research design is focused on assessing broad concepts, much of the following chapter will also focus on refining the broad concepts into more

refined options in order to arrive at solutions that are more feasible. In other words, research may determine that one or more concepts are not politically feasible and may be analogous to eating the elephant in one bite. However, specific refinements of those options, while not discussed in the existing literature, may provide solutions, that are more feasible, acceptable, and--in an extension of the elephant analogy--palatable to Army policy makers. This refinement of options will, in effect, contribute to the existing body of works on the topic and may ultimately provide topics for further study.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In the preceding chapter, this study established four broad concepts from existing literature that various proponents believe would enhance the Army's ability to conduct MOOTW while maintaining combat readiness for major theater war. In this chapter, the study will analyze each broad concept to determine if it meets screening criteria established in chapter 3. In the event that an option does not meet screening criteria, the option will be examined to determine if certain refinements of the broad concept might render the option more feasible. Specific elements of the broad concept that meet the screening criteria will then be analyzed using the decision criteria outlined in the previous chapter: political viability, effect on OPTEMPO, and flexibility.

Medium-Weight Forces: No Longer an Option?

The Army decided to begin its experiment with medium-weight brigades after this research project began. As stated in the introduction, the purpose behind this decision was not specifically to enhance MOOTW effectiveness. In order to counter perceptions that the new brigades were designed solely for MOOTW, staff officers working on the new concept refer to the medium-weight brigades as "interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs)" (Naylor 1999, 12). However, proponents of medium-weight forces clearly believe that these forces will be able to perform MOOTW missions more effectively than current forces. As the Gordon and Wilson study points out:

Such a force could be the initial element of a global maneuver of land power as part of a joint expeditionary force. In some circumstances such as an SSC, the medium-weight aero-motorized force may be sufficient to deal with the crisis. In other circumstances tending toward a MTW class conflict, the aero-motorized

forces will be the tip of the Army's spear, to be followed by heavier Army armored and mechanized forces. (1998, 8)

While the medium-weight forces are still a work in progress, a thumbnail sketch of what these forces will look like is beginning to emerge. Recent published reports from various open sources portray a force with the following capabilities:

1. Brigade combat teams (BCT) with an approximate strength of 3,500 soldiers, easily deployable on C-5/C-17 aircraft. BCTs would be able to deploy within 96 hours of notification.
2. Equipped with "off-the-shelf" medium armored vehicles that will be selected through a competitive process. The BCTs would be centered around three infantry battalions with approximately 780 troops each.
3. Fire support assets would also be more rapidly deployable, possibly wheeled High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers or self-propelled 155mm howitzers on a medium-weight chassis.
4. A slimmed down support battalion designed to provide intra-theater Just-In-Time (JIT) logistics.

The Army's current plan is to convert the two brigades at Fort Lewis by 2001 and three additional brigades by 2004.

Because of the decision to pursue the formation of interim BCTs, the medium-weight concept can no longer be considered an option on the table. The concept is well on its way to implementation with the full support of the Army hierarchy and members of Congress. However, the creation of IBCTs will not end the debate on ways to enhance MOOTW effectiveness through force structure changes. Since the IBCTs were not

specifically designed to enhance MOOTW effectiveness, the creation of medium-weight forces cannot hope to address fully the concerns raised in this paper. Thus, the paper will continue to analyze other options for steps that can be taken in conjunction with the IBCT initiative to enhance MOOTW effectiveness.

Option 1: A Brigade-Based Force

Proponents of a brigade-based force often disagree on the details of how such a force might be employed. These differences are discussed in detail in chapter 2. The following vision of a brigade-based force, based on an amalgamation of concepts discussed in the existing literature, is offered as a baseline for discussion:

1. The brigade would replace the division as the primary tactical formation in the U.S. Army. Accordingly, combat support and combat service support units would be designed to support the brigade, not the division. Brigades would be capable of working directly for a JTF headquarters.
2. Brigade staffs would become more robust and would be focused on fighting the close battle. Division staffs would become essentially a planning staff whose primary focus would be on the deep and future battle. (Some proponents believe that a division staff will no longer be required; however, as the nexus between the operational and tactical level, others believe the Corps (or JTF) headquarters will exceed its capability to effectively command and control brigades without an intermediate headquarters.)
3. Brigades would be able to support themselves logistically. Likewise, the brigade commander would have organic aviation, fire support, engineer, and air defense assets. Proponents of this option would like to see brigade commanders rate CS and CSS subordinate commanders in the same way they rate combat maneuver commanders. In

this way, commanders and their subordinates could establish a habitual relationship both in peacetime training and war.

Ironically, General Matthew B. Ridgway seemed to envision a similar force structure in 1955, when he stated:

The Army must be a streamlined, hard-hitting force armed . . . with greatly improved weapons. Its basic combat units will probably be a grouping of small battle groups of all arms. . . . These units . . . will be semi-independent, self-contained and capable of operating over great distances on a fluid battlefield for long periods with a minimum of control and support by higher headquarters. . . . All elements of these forces, except the heaviest armored units, should be transportable by air. . . . Stylistic concepts of battle and formalized battle organizations as we have known them will no longer be employed (Ridgway 1955).

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Argument

The main proponent of the brigade-based force is Colonel Douglas Macgregor. Other writers that have been borrowed from to create a picture of a prospective brigade-based force concept include retired Colonel John R. Brinkerhoff and Colonel David A. Fastabend. All three men have extensive experience working on force structure and security issues. Macgregor commanded a cavalry squadron at the Battle of 73 Easting, holds a doctorate from the University of Virginia, and was a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Brinkerhoff is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Among his many other qualifications, Colonel Fastabend served as the Army National Security Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Macgregor's book *Breaking the Phalanx* provides a thoughtful, well-documented proposal for creating a land-based force composed of "highly mobile, self-contained, independent 'all arms' combat forces in being" that would be able

to leverage new technologies and fight as part of a JTF. He uses the example of the Roman Legion as a force that was able to subdue the previously invincible Macedonian Phalanx by discarding old paradigms. He would include four different types of forces in his design: heavy combat groups, airborne and air assault groups, and heavy and light recon strike groups. Forces required for MOOTW would be specifically designed to meet a specific MOOTW threat (1997, 86).

Brinkerhoff and Fastabend argue in favor of Macgregor's proposal but disagree with him and with each other over several important points. Foremost among the points of contention is whether or not a brigade-based force will still require a division headquarters. Brinkerhoff and Macgregor believe that Division Headquarters will no longer be needed, while Fastabend believes an intermediate headquarters will still be needed to effectively control the brigade groups. This level of disagreement among proponents of the same broad concept suggests that this option would require much more debate before the details of implementation could be agreed upon.

Despite its many visionary qualities, the argument for a brigade-based force leaves many questions unanswered, particularly with respect to MOOTW. Macgregor talks about "tailoring" groups for MOOTW missions, but does not address creating additional slots for specialties in high demand for MOOTW. Also, his concept does not discuss how a combat force "tailored" for MOOTW would acquire additional MOOTW expertise other than substituting an engineer battalion for an artillery battalion.

Advantages

This option would offer several advantages from a MOOTW perspective. First, as a smaller, more agile force, a brigade would be more deployable for MOOTW contingencies. Recent deployments, most notably in Bosnia and Kosovo, have required about a brigade-size element of combat troops. A brigade-based force would adapt gracefully to these types of MOOTW contingencies. The brigade would be able to deploy either independently or as a subordinate command of a JTF or division headquarters based on mission analysis.

Secondly, as a force capable of sustaining itself, brigades could be “swapped” between either a division or a JTF headquarters, thereby allowing a more flexible mix of combat capability. In other words, the brigade-based force would allow for more “modular” packages of combat capabilities. As an example, a “heavy recon strike group” could quickly augment an “airborne and air assault group” tailored for MOOTW based on a revised threat assessment. Because of their modularity, interoperability problems would be minimized. This ability to “plug in” brigades to a JTF or division headquarters in a small-scale or MOOTW contingency affords a greater degree of flexibility than the current force structure allows.

Disadvantages

Such a radical departure from the current way of doing business would be certain to create some turbulence in units initially. There would have to be some concern that the friction created by attaching a brigade to a new division headquarters for deployment at the last moment would nullify the cohesion gained at the company and battalion level. Personalities are very important in a values based, people-oriented organization and

suddenly working for a new division commander in the heat of crisis might lead to an increase in what Clausewitz called “the fog of war.”

Secondly, a number of thorny issues would have to be bridged between the broad concept and implementation. For example, should the new brigades be commanded by brigadier generals, as Colonel Douglas Macgregor suggests, or by colonels? What would happen to the DIVARTY commander, the Division Engineer, and Division ADCOORD under the new plan? If the number of command slots for low-density specialties decreased, a number of subsequent turf battles would ensue. What institutional incentive would the low-density branches have for cooperating with the new plan?

Screening Criteria

The screening criteria established in the research methodology directed that, in order to be viable, an option must not result in a degradation of combat readiness, must address the worst case scenarios postulated by leading futurists, and must adhere to NCA guidance as codified in the *NSS*, *NMS*, and *JV2010*. While the screening criteria call for qualitative judgments by the researcher, they are, nonetheless, a good azimuth check against an academically irrelevant study. In the case of the brigade-based force option, all of the established screening criteria appear to be met.

Combat Readiness: The brigade-based option would at the very least, in the eyes of most observers, maintain combat readiness at the current level. The number of combat troops would not diminish under this option. Instead of organizing to fight around ten divisions, the Army would simply organize to fight around thirty brigades. Using a combination of strategic air and pre-positioned maritime stocks, even the heavy brigades would be deployable in a shorter time than was previously possible. A common

complaint in MOOTW operations is that brigades show up with slice elements with which they do not have a habitual relationship (Bolger 1995, 329). The brigade-based force described in this paper would help address that criticism by reducing the ad hoc approach to integrating combat multipliers.

Worst Case Scenarios: Similarly, the brigade-based force would be able to address the worst-case scenarios postulated by Kaplan, Toffler, Huntington, and Barber. With thirty brigades in the active force, resources could be allocated so that a fraction of those forces would be able to receive training on asymmetric threats and other MOOTW specific tasks while the remainder of the force could be earmarked for training for MTW.

Strategic Guidance: Finally, the brigade-based force would be able to meet current strategic guidance as outlined in the *NSS*, the *NMS*, and *JV2010*. A brigade-based option would not endanger the three core objectives of the *NSS*: enhance security, bolster America's prosperity, and promote democracy abroad. The three imperatives of the *NMS*--shape, respond, prepare now--could certainly be met using smaller, more agile, and, yet, sufficiently lethal formations. The *JV 2010* goal of full-spectrum dominance would not be jeopardized by a shift in focus to brigades over divisions.

Decision Criteria

Political Viability: Determining a proper assessment tool for political viability is a difficult task at best. Historically, any radical change in force structure has been met with opposition both within the Army and from Congress. One of the advantages of the brigade-based proposal is that most of the restructuring would be internal to the active force. Therefore, the political battle in Congress might not be as difficult as those created

by other concepts in the paper. The armor community does not have nearly as much influence in Congress as State Adjutant Generals and the NGB, for instance.

The lack of external opposition does not mean that no political struggle will emerge over this concept. A political struggle is likely to take place internally within the Army where the armor community, for example, does have a lot of influence. The political opposition is likely to be fierce among certain communities within the army, especially if there are no institutional incentives (for example, equal or greater number O6-level commands) for those lobbies to support the new force structure. Keep in mind, also, that any potential decision maker on this issue will almost certainly be a former division commander. Even the most forward looking and open-minded officers would no doubt have misgivings about restructuring the force that has served the army so well throughout much its history.

The Army, of course, is a hierarchical organization, not a democratic one. A current or future Chief of Staff, with a modicum of support on Capitol Hill and the White House, could order a change to the brigade-based force and the rank and file would have to make it work. However, the broad concept of a brigade-based force is still a controversial one, as evidenced by the well-documented adverse reaction to Colonel Macgregor's initial proposal. To forcefully impose such a controversial concept at this stage could have a deleterious effect on the morale of the Army at a time when morale troubles, recruitment, and retention are already paramount concerns.

In short, the broad concept of a brigade-based force may well prove to be too radical to attract widespread support across the Army at this time. In other words, the brigade-based Army may be a bureaucratic "bridge too far." In view of this reality,

political viability would seem unlikely. However, certain aspects of the broad concept may be feasible as part of an incremental approach to force structure reform. For example, some of the changes advocated to make brigades more self-sufficient and adaptable to operating as part of a JTF may be implemented without buying in to the overall concept for sweeping, revolutionary change.

Effect on OPTEMPO: At first look, analysis of this decision criterion would seem to be easy to assess, as there is no change in the number of combat formations. However, based on the implementation of the concept, the potential may exist to reduce OPTEMPO rates. The goal of the brigade-based force should be to make every combat brigade more flexible and, in the process, more capable of deploying for missions along the full spectrum of conflict, from peacetime engagement to small-scale contingencies to major theater war. If this goal is achieved, the onus of MOOTW missions can be spread more evenly across the force. This action would reduce the “burnout factor” among current MOOTW forces of choice (10th Mountain Division, for example). Also, the establishment of brigade groups with habitual relationships may reduce some of the ad hoc qualities of recent deployments.

To explain how OPTEMPO might be reduced under the brigade force concept, I will paraphrase a proposal offered by Colonel David A. Fastabend (1998, 8-10). With a baseline of thirty brigades, the Army could establish a “red-amber-green” system wherein six brigades (about the limit of what can be strategically deployed rapidly during a crisis) would be earmarked for immediate contingency deployment. Three brigades would be earmarked for forward presence (Korea and Kuwait). Of the remaining twenty-one brigades, one third would be available for continuous deployment to MOOTW (if

required), with the other two-thirds engaged in recovery, maintenance, and training. As Fastabend points out, seven brigades are the sum of initial Army deployments to Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia. If implemented properly, this option is likely to reduce the OPTEMPO for individual units.

To amplify this point further, the example of LTC William David's 2-14 Infantry task force in Somalia is instructive:

Since David had taken charge in December of 1991, his unit had secured Haitian refugees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, gone to south Florida to help with hurricane relief, deployed to the port of New York en route to Somalia only to be waved off at the last minute, and sent Company A to Mogadishu with 1-22d Infantry's QRF rotation, all besides standard training exercises. It was a good battalion, well-trained in the nuances of these dirty quasi-wars. Like most of 10th Mountain, however, David's men had been ridden pretty hard. . . . Here, in the unfamiliar, stitched-together, corner of these units, lay the price of stringing out the busy 10th Mountain Division. (Bolger 1995, 304)

The deployment rotation concept described here would attempt to allocate units to MOOTW missions more equitably, thereby avoiding the type of fatigue likely to degrade readiness and morale.

This proposal is similar in nature to concepts already implemented by the Navy and the Air Force. The Navy is organized around twelve carrier battle groups, with two and one-half deployed at once during peacetime. Likewise, the Air Force has adopted a concept of ten aerospace expeditionary forces with two deployed at once during peacetime. These concepts have allowed the two sister services to achieve some degree of predictability in their sailors' and airmen's lives.

Flexibility: The third criterion, flexibility, measures the force's ability to perform a variety of missions. Under current concepts proposed, the brigade-based force would be optimized for flexibility in two ways. First, each brigade or "group" would be made

smaller and more rapidly deployable by taking advantage of new technologies.

Presumably, this would allow all units to be capable of pulling their weight for MOOTW missions. Secondly, units would be tailored for greater independence, allowing them to arrive in theater with less dependence on higher echelons for command, control, and logistical support. In short, this option is likely to significantly enhance flexibility.

Option 2: American Constabulary Force

A proposed American Constabulary Force, as discussed in the existing literature, would be intentionally less lethal than conventional forces. It would possess some or all of the capabilities discussed earlier: a beefed up CA and PSYOP capability, special training in language and culture, a medical and dental capability, robust engineer units for building infrastructure, and a large contingent of military police for checkpoint and crowd control. Constabulary forces are not new to the Army. Constabulary forces occupied the South during the Reconstruction Era, served in Haiti from 1915-1934, conducted nation-building activities in the Philippines from 1899-1904, and served in post-World War II Germany.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Argument

The review of existing literature failed to discover a seminal work on a modern constabulary force analogous to Macgregor's *Breaking the Phalanx*. Colonel Don Snider and Lieutenant Colonel Bob Adolph, among others, make compelling arguments in essay form; however, most of the arguments made by Snider and Adolph were refuted in several sources. For example, several authors, to include Jennifer Taw, David Persselin, and Maren Leed of the RAND Corporation, point out that the Snider-Adolph proposals

for a constabulary force would have been inadequate to deal with the proliferation of recent peace operations:

A historical review reveals that the number and scale of POs [peace operations] the Army has supported in recent years would quickly absorb all the assets of even a division-sized POF [Peace Operations Force]. Within just over a three-year period, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia required one mechanized battalion from the 24th Infantry Division and six light infantry battalions from the 10th Mountain Division, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti required the same force, and the follow-on force included an armored cavalry squadron and three light infantry battalions from the 25th Infantry Division. These operations were significantly smaller and shorter than the ongoing mission in Bosnia. Over the first thirteen months, Operation Join Endeavor employed more than ten armored or mechanized battalions under the command of two different divisions. The extent of CS/CSS and SOF forces demanded by these operations required the Army to draw on all its active component strength and to mobilize reserve and National Guard units. (Taw, Persselin, and Leed 1998, 60-61)

Taw, Persselin, and Leed join Fastabend and strategist Ralph Peters in arguing against specialized units formed for MOOTW. In the case of the RAND Study authors and Fastabend, they justify their arguments based on numerous interviews and studies. Peters' argument, on the other hand, is based on his studied opinion. According to Peters, "Our forces are respected as peacekeepers specifically because of the combat power that stands behind them. A secondary force, unprepared to conduct sustained combat operations, would not only prove ineffective, but unwanted internationally" (Peters 1999, 78).

Based on works available in the existing literature, critics of the ACF concept have the stronger argument at present. Their research is more comprehensive and their arguments are bolstered by anecdotal evidence from recent operations in the Balkans. However, future visions of constabulary forces may be able to address their criticisms, especially as the concept gains circulation in academic circles.

Advantages

The biggest advantage of a constabulary force is that it would provide a unit with a very specialized capability that could perform constabulary functions while allowing conventional forces to focus on their MTW mission essential task lists (METL).

Proponents see the ACF as a method of decreasing OPTEMPO for “go to war” units.

Also, units with a specific MOOTW focus would be better equipped to deal with the

stresses presented in a MOOTW environment. Special training in crowd control,

language, and cultural traditions would allow the ACF to “win the hearts and minds,” a

task critical in many MOOTW missions. Robust contingents of CA, PSYOP, MPs,

heavy engineers, and medical personnel would contribute to a tailored force that could

help promote peace and stability around the world.

Disadvantages

One of the potential disadvantages of an ACF is that it could create a bifurcated military. A force with such a distinctly different mission would potentially create a “we vs. they” mentality between the ACF and conventional forces. Ralph Peters gives voice to this concern in his essay “Heavy Peace”:

Another proposed solution, offered in various forms, involves a two-tier military establishment: ready, fully developed elite forces to fight our wars, and a secondary, cheaper, constabulary military to do jobs the “fighters” don’t want to do. Apart from the impossibility of recruiting international garbage collectors, the argument founders on cost analysis (it would not, in fact, be cheaper), inevitable jealousies, and the damage that consequent reductions in the number of combat units would do to our forces. Besides, we already have a “B-team” of less and less ready forces on active duty. (1999, 78)

A second disadvantage is that the ACF described in existing literature may not be able to fully protect itself against all possible threats. While the ACF would be

committed in generally benign environments, there is no guarantee that those environments would remain benign. Critics of the ACF concept cite the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNOSOM I in Somalia, and the multinational force in Liberia as examples of the ineffectiveness of forces without a credible combat capability (Taw, Persselin, and Leed 1998, 60).

A third disadvantage of the ACF concept is that it would have the potential to become a lightning rod for criticism from opponents of interventionism. In fact, the political viability of an ACF would be in serious question, because the mere creation of such a force would create charges of playing global policeman at best and playing neo-imperialist at worst. Unlike the brigade-based force concept, the ACF would require enormous administration and congressional support in order to come into being.

Finally, the ACF concept, like the brigade-based force concept, may lack sufficient institutional and political support to be considered a viable option in the near future. LTC Walter Kretchik, in *A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, explains the differing viewpoints on specialized units for peace operations:

Some senior military leaders have argued that certain U.S. military units should be trained *purely* in peace operations instead of conventional combat. Other, more traditionalist-minded officers have responded that the role of the U.S. military remains unchanged: to fight and win America's conventional wars. To these officers, a peace operation is nothing more than a special mission requiring only specific training prior to the commitment of troops. . . . Thus far in the debate, the traditional thinkers have prevailed. (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 28)

Many officers are fearful that an increased focus on peace operations and other MOOTW will detract from the Army's Battle Focus, the concept at the heart of the Army's training philosophy captured in FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*.

Screening Criteria

Combat readiness: Proponents of the ACF concept believe that overall combat readiness would be enhanced because the remainder of the force would be "off the hook" for MOOTW missions and could focus solely on an MTW-focused METL. However, if one starts with the assumption that the end strength of the overall force will not change (a good assumption in light of current budget realities), then the creation of a separate force for MOOTW tasks would, in fact, have a deleterious effect on the combat readiness of the force. In order to pay for the new force, troops would have to be cut from the current force structure to create billets for the ACF. Thus, short of a commitment to create additional slots, the ACF option would fail to meet this screening criterion.

Worst Case Scenario: One of the primary criticisms of the ACF is that it may not possess the ability to fight its way out of every situation. In an atmosphere like the one described in "The Coming Anarchy," would an ACF possess the firepower and lethality to defuse every possible contingency? Once again, the examples of UNPROFOR and UNOSOM I are instructive. If an ACF had to be augmented with traditional forces for its protection, the argument that an ACF could reduce OPTEMPO for traditional forces would become mute.

In other scenarios envisioned by futurists, the dangers of asymmetric technical threats and cultural war would not appear to have any greater likely impact on an ACF type force than they would on traditional forces. ACF troops may have a greater ability

to deal with cultural exigencies due to their specialized training. With respect to asymmetric terrorist threats, the focus on force protection, as part of a specialized training regimen, should allow an ACF a capability on par with traditional forces.

In the RAND study cited previously, the authors suggest that an ACF would have trouble operating in a MOOTW environment if the situation rapidly deteriorated into armed conflict. Stating the need for a MOOTW force to be an effective combat force, the authors state, “As Army leaders well know, combat effectiveness requires more than a part time effort. But part-time combat training is precisely what the POF concept implies” (60). Just as forces that have heavy weapons may not wish to show them constantly in an effort to win the hearts and minds (as in Vietnam), they also do not want to be without the capabilities these weapons offer in a crisis. In other words, it is better to have tanks in the motor pool and not need them than to need tanks and not have them. Because of its likely inability to meet threats envisioned in a worst-case scenario, the ACF option does not meet the second screening criterion.

Strategic Guidance. Many of the proponents of the ACF point to its potential for promoting democracy abroad--one of the three core objectives of the *NSS*--as one of its primary selling points. The impact of the ACF on the other two core objectives--enhancing national security and bolstering economic prosperity--is open to debate. Viewed in the larger context, however, the ACF concept would appear to fit within the overall *NSS*.

With regard to the *NMS*, the ACF concept would be an asset in achieving the stated goal of shaping the international environment. Likewise, the ACF would provide a force for responding quickly to crises at the low end of the military spectrum. The ACF

also fits into the paradigm of preparing now for an uncertain future. The applicability of the ACF to the *JV 2010* goal of full spectrum dominance is also difficult to assess. The ACF would enhance the concept of full spectrum dominance by providing a unique set of options on the low end of the conflict spectrum. However, the ACF might divert resources from forces at the high end of the conflict spectrum. If the NCA were to deem the payoff in shaping worth the risk, then the ACF would meet this screening criterion.

As the preceding analysis shows, the ACF concept fails to meet all three screening criteria established in chapter 3. As a broad concept, the ACF would simply take too many soldiers out of warfighting units and reduce the focus on fighting and winning two near simultaneous MTWs. Furthermore, the ACF might conceivably find itself in situations where a transition to armed combat may be necessary. Despite these weaknesses, the idea of a constabulary force will continue to attract attention by academicians and senior leaders. While the broad concept is not viable as currently envisioned, certain aspects of it may be refined to present a range of more feasible options.

Option 3: Realignment of Active and Reserve Forces

A third option to enhance the effectiveness of the Army in MOOTW is to consider realigning certain forces within the Total Army. Many of the specialties in highest demand for MOOTW have a dual military-civil application and are found primarily in the U.S. Army Reserve and NG. For example, 97 percent of CA units, 82 percent of public affairs, 85 percent of medical brigades, 73 percent of heavy engineer battalions, 66 percent of MP battalions, and 81 percent of PSYOP capability resides in the reserve component (Reserve Forces Policy Board 1998, 9). Some of the problems

associated with assimilating these specialists into the active force during a crisis have already been discussed in chapter 2.

NG forces may also be able to reduce the OPTEMPO of active forces by developing their own MOOTW capable forces that could augment active forces in crisis areas. Many of the mission essential tasks for MOOTW correspond well to the types of tasks that NG units would be required to perform for their state missions (for example, humanitarian assistance and support to domestic civil authorities). To be of greater value in MOOTW, some NG units might be required to convert from heavy combat formations (armor and mechanized infantry) to CS and CSS units (MP, engineers, aviation, and transportation).

The proponents of realignment have thus far written only in general terms. In order to provide a straw man position from which changes and modifications can be made, the following specific proposals are offered as potential measures that might be included in a realignment proposal:

1. Increase the number of MPs in a division from a company to a battalion.
2. Create additional active duty CA/PSYOP billets and assign them to CINC areas of responsibility (AOR) to provide greater flexibility and responsiveness in MOOTW.
3. Convert limited number of heavy combat formations in NG to heavy engineer and MP units with dual military-civil roles.
4. Increase NG training in MOOTW.

5. Convert limited number of combat units without dual role capability at echelons above division (artillery and air defense artillery) to NG. This is the part of the solution that assumes risk.

To clarify these specific proposals further, the rationale for each will be explained in ensuing paragraphs.

More MPs: Recent MOOTW missions, particularly peace operations, have shown the value of military police in dealing with civilian populations. A few quotes from historical accounts will provide useful insight into the utility of MPs in MOOTW:

One brigade commander noted that, given the realities of the crisis, he had come to rely more on his staff judge advocate than his operations officer and that he would gladly have traded one of his rifle companies for an MP company "well trained in peacetime ROE. (Yates 1991, 71)

U.S. Military Police proved invaluable in many street situations in Port-au-Prince. More accustomed by training than infantrymen to carrying out arrests and other missions at the low end of the violence continuum, MPs demonstrated the ability to seize suspects, while exercising restraint and preventing situations that might have degenerated into exchanges of gunfire. (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 103-104)

The escalating civilian violence in Kosovo suggests combat troops actually provide limited utility in war zones where the military fighting has ended but fear and hatred still run white hot. As a result, critics say, if the United States is to prevail in conflicts where its own interests are engaged--and avoid getting bogged down in endless violence--it will have to beef up its use of military police, perhaps even training more of them each year. (Wood 2000, 15)

As the above quotes demonstrate, MPs have become indispensable to the successful conduct of MOOTW. If Kaplan's prophecy of increased ethnic conflict holds true, military police will continue to be the force of choice in MOOTW missions. With only 18,000 in the active force, the Army should consider increasing the number of slots for MPs. A good place to start would be increasing the number of MPs in a division from a company to a battalion. Division commanders would have the flexibility to detach up

to company-size units to brigade commanders. When not employed in MOOTW, the MPs could be used to provide daily law enforcement, train infantry units in riot control techniques, or train for their wartime missions.

Improve CA/PSYOP Capability: As stated previously, the vast majority of CA and PSYOP capabilities reside in the RC. Because of the high demand for their skills in MOOTW, there is increasing concern that recruitment and retention of CA and PSYOP personnel may suffer (Myers 2000, 1). Also, matching capabilities to requirements in the absence of a PRSC has been problematic (Taw and Vick 1997, 189). One way to ameliorate this problem and improve the responsiveness of these important assets is to create more active duty slots for CA and PSYOP personnel.

The Army should consider assigning regional PSYOP battalions to the standing forces of geographic Commanders in Chief (CINCs), as Major Steven Collins suggested in a recent article in *Parameters* (Collins 1999, 67). CA units could be allocated in a similar fashion. This action would increase their ability to advise the CINC's staff on their proper role in MOOTW missions. Alternatively, small active duty CA and PSYOP detachments could be permanently assigned to divisions to increase their responsiveness at the tactical level. At division level and below, commanders have very little experience working with either of these units and may not know how to employ them when they are available.

Conversion of Units in the NG: According to William Johnsen of the Strategic Studies Institute, an anticipated increase in SSCs and shaping operations will require conversion of heavy combat formations in the NG to CS and CSS units (Johnsen 1998, 35). Incidentally, studies show that these same units will be needed to support two

MTWs (Taw, Persselin, and Leed 1998, 26). Thus, rapid conversion of these units will provide a “win-win” for the Army by providing more high demand units with a dual military-civil role. The NG will also be able to employ these assets in their state roles. Transportation, MP, and heavy engineers are among the units that should be converted.

Increase NG Training in MOOTW: This is a straightforward proposal that would allow the NG to take a more active role in reducing the OPTEMPO for active duty units. At the same time, the NG would be able to receive training and equipment that would enhance their effectiveness in their state role, specifically support to civil authority and humanitarian assistance. Colonel Brinkerhoff, earlier cited as a proponent of the brigade-based force concept, advocates designating a NG division (he suggests the 29th Light Infantry Division) as a minor contingency force that could train for and participate in MOOTW during peacetime to gain experience. Then, in the event of a major regional conflict (MRC), the NG division could backfill an active duty force participating in MOOTW, allowing the active component force to withdraw and redeploy to the MRC (Brinkerhoff 1996, 11).

Convert Limited Active Component Combat Assets to NG: This is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the realignment proposal. However, it is important to realize that in order to gain capability in one area, the Army, because of budget realities, must be prepared to accept risk in another area. Perhaps the area where the Army can afford to accept the most risk is in artillery and air defense units at echelons above division. The performance of NG artillery units in Operation Desert Storm suggests that NG units can provide these assets with minimal degradation of capability in the event of a MTW. In smaller scale contingencies, these assets would have limited utility. If the Army is forced

to "pay" for the additional MP, CA, and PSYOP slots, this may be one of the first places they can look.

Advantages

The primary advantage of the realignment approach is that it recognizes the importance of including all three components in solving the dilemma of how to do MOOTW and MTW with equal effectiveness. The Army recently mobilized more than 700 soldiers from the 49th Armored Division (Texas ARNG) to serve as the command and control element for NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) Multinational Division-North in Bosnia. The 29th Infantry Division (Light) from Maryland and Virginia and the 28th Infantry Division from Pennsylvania will start their SFOR rotations in October of 2001 and 2002, respectively (Steele 2000, 29). The process of preparing these NG divisions for their rotations and their subsequent performance will no doubt provide a number of lessons learned that will enable the Army to make better use of the NG in future MOOTW missions.

Another advantage of realignment is that it will allow forces in the NG to train on MOOTW tasks that are more closely related to their state missions. Also, NG units can benefit immensely from the type of units that they would inherit under this proposal. Heavy engineers and MPs would provide state governors with a robust capability in the event of natural disasters or civil disturbances. Finally, NG units that are well trained in MOOTW tasks will give regional CINCs the option of replacing active units conducting MOOTW with NG units in the event of near simultaneous MRCs.

Realignment will also address the problem of providing high demand occupational specialties (for example, CA units) to commanders without the requirement

for a PSRC. The creation of a habitual relationship between CA, PSYOP, and MP personnel with their supported commander will reduce the ad hoc qualities that have beset previous MOOTW missions and allow commanders to use these assets more effectively. The habitual presence of these combat multipliers at the tactical level will allow commanders to integrate them more effectively in the planning and execution of missions in war as well as in MOOTW.

Disadvantages

The obvious disadvantage of adding more units like CA and PSYOP to the active force is that it would require a reduction in other types of forces (assuming no change in end strength). Deciding where the active forces can accept risk to provide additional slots for these units would be difficult, at best. Since most of the units are combat multipliers that would not necessarily need a lot of slots created, a modest increase in end strength or reshuffling of non-combat specialties might be possible.

A second disadvantage of realignment would be negotiating with state governors who are likely to oppose any major changes to the current force structure. Heavy combat formations are a sign of prestige in the NG and governors would naturally be reluctant to convert those formations to MP units or engineers. The Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR) may also have some reluctance to convert Reserve units. Creating a realignment proposal that would satisfy the need for reform within the Army--yet be acceptable to all three constituencies--will present an immense challenge.

Screening Criteria

Combat Readiness: Adding the types of units that William Johnsen, Jennifer Taw, and Michael Vick advocate should not have a drastic effect on combat readiness.

The additional active duty positions they call for would not require a significant reduction in the number of combat arms troops. In addition, the CA specialists, heavy engineers, MP, and transportation units they call for would have a dual role. They could enhance combat effectiveness in war and MOOTW alike. A corresponding decrease of these specialties in the RC would help offset the cost of adding them to the active component.

Worst Case Scenarios: In the scenarios envisioned by Kaplan, the Tofflers, and Huntington, the vagaries of ethnic conflict, asymmetric threats, and cultural wars demand forces that can be flexibly applied across the entire spectrum of conflict. The changes advocated by Johnsen, Taw, and Vick, among others, would help the Army achieve a greater degree of flexibility. By adding more troops that have a dual military-civil application, the U.S. Army would be able to employ those forces more skillfully to help resolve conflicts. These types of forces are often referred to as “combat multipliers” because they enhance the effectiveness of combat forces without increasing the size of the combat contingent. A force with greater numbers of these combat multipliers would be able to cope with the worst case scenarios envisioned by leading futurists.

Strategic Guidance: An active force tailored with additional troops that can be flexibly employed in both MOOTW and MTW would correspond well to the *NMS* of shape, respond, and prepare now. The proponents of this approach do not advocate reduction in combat forces, so the imperative to fight and win two near simultaneous MTWs would not be endangered. This option would comply with strategic level guidance.

Decision Criteria

Political Viability: Any force structure option is likely to face political difficulties, but this option may have the most difficult challenge of all. Unlike the brigade-based force concept, this concept would require considerable political support, both from within the Army and from Congress. Within the Army, realignment proponents can expect opposition from the NGB and OCAR. Outside of the Army, state governors and adjutant generals would also be skeptical of any changes, particularly changes that would take away heavy combat formations. The Department of Defense would have to approve any force structure changes and Congress would have the final word.

The enormous challenge of gaining acceptance for a realignment proposal from all these disparate groups is not totally unrealistic, however. Despite a natural resistance to change, each component would be motivated by institutional incentives to sign on to a balanced realignment proposal. For its part, the NGB would be likely to receive a modest increase in funding to convert and train units for MOOTW. Also, the individual state units would acquire equipment and skills that are applicable to their states' needs. The MOOTW focus would help NG units to hone their skills in law enforcement, stability operations, and ensuring safety and security. A final enticement might be the prospect of favorable publicity for their enhanced role in MOOTW.

The Army Reserve would stand to lose a number of MP, CA, and PSYOP specialists as part of a proposed realignment. Within the context of a comprehensive realignment, these losses might not amount to a significant reduction in USAR end strength. The Army could replace the MP, CA, and PSYOP slots by creating more CSS

positions in the RC. Other options might include allowing more reservists to serve in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schoolhouse positions and in higher echelon headquarters.

Despite a possible loss in end strength, OCAR and its supporters on Capitol Hill may not resist a realignment proposal similar to the one discussed. Recent news reports reveal that the Army is concerned that frequent deployments may ultimately degrade the Army's ability to recruit and retain certain "high demand" specialists like CA, PSYOP, and MPs (Myers 2000, 1). With this present difficulty in mind, OCAR may have more incentive than the NGB to support realignment.

The current pace of operations and the Army's increasing reliance on the NG and Reserve may make reform a more feasible option now than in past years. However, any realignment proposal is bound to meet with skepticism. Historians may recall that some of the more bitter debate in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was over the issue of the size of the standing Army vis-à-vis the national and state militia. Given this historical context and earlier discussion, it would be foolish to assume that support for the realignment option would be likely. In short, though passage of the proposal would not be impossible, political support for this option is unlikely.

Effect on OPTEMPO: Proponents of realignment believe that there will be a positive effect on OPTEMPO because more "high demand" units can share the load of MOOTW missions. While this is true for such units as MPs and CA, realignment would have a negligible effect on combat units. The frequency and duration of their rotations for MOOTW would not necessarily change. Still, the units in highest demand would see a reduction in their OPTEMPO. Thus, this option is likely to reduce OPTEMPO.

Flexibility: This option would give units the capability to perform missions across the spectrum of conflict with greater effectiveness. The types of units that would be added to the active force structure would be effective in MOOTW and MTW alike. As organic units in a division, these units would grow accustomed to working with brigades and battalions. Likewise, battalion and brigade commanders would become more proficient in employing these units in accordance with their capabilities. Still, this option would not drastically change the way units are organized nor would it result in more multi-mission capable equipment. This option is likely to marginally enhance flexibility.

Grading the Options

Based on the research design described in chapter 3, only option 1 (brigade-based force) and option 3 (realignment) met the screening criteria. The decision matrix below (Table 3) summarizes the assessment of each option based on the decision criteria. In this decision matrix, all criteria have equal weight.

Based upon an evaluation of the decision criteria, the brigade-based force option is the best option. It is, therefore, the recommended course of action. However, this option should not be the only option open to Army policy makers. While visionary and holistic, this concept, along with the other two concepts discussed, provides a vehicle for revolutionary change. Yet, change in large bureaucratic organizations is often most effective when it is incremental. The remainder of this chapter will discuss options available to policy makers that combine the less controversial aspects of the broad, more revolutionary concepts.

TABLE 3
DECISION MATRIX FOR FUTURE STRUCTURE OPTIONS

	Political Viability	Effect on OPTEMPO	Flexibility	Total
Option 1: Brigade-Based Force	3- Political Support Unlikely	2 – Likely to reduce OPTEMPO	1 – Likely to significantly enhance flexibility	6
Option 3: Realignment of Active-Reserve	3- Political Support Unlikely	2- Likely to reduce OPTEMPO	2- Likely to marginally enhance flexibility	7

Note: Lower totals are preferred.

Combining the Options: An Incremental Approach

While most of the existing literature focuses on broad, visionary concepts, policy makers often look for solutions that are more practical and can be implemented incrementally. Organizational leaders often believe it is necessary to build a consensus before embarking on a path of change. Broad concepts such as the Brigade-based force, the American Constabulary Force, and comprehensive realignment are not concepts upon which a consensus is likely to emerge. Despite the advantages that these concepts may offer in reducing OPTEMPO or enhancing flexibility, these concepts may prove unworkable in light of the paucity of political and organizational support available for revolutionary change.

Many of the advantages of the brigade-based force may be attainable without changing the current division structure. Through training, particularly at CTCs, units can learn to establish habitual working relationships and reduce ad hoc task organizations. As training centers begin to focus more on training for MOOTW, units will become

better equipped to employ elements that are necessary in a MOOTW environment. Force planners can continue to develop methods to make brigades more self-sufficient and strategically deployable.

Many efforts at reform are already underway. The resources dedicated to the new interim brigades at Fort Lewis represent a commitment to making brigades more flexible and deployable. Training methodologies at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk focus on teaching units how to employ combat multipliers in a MOOTW environment. All of these initiatives will ultimately make brigades more capable of operating across the conflict spectrum.

A second element of the brigade-based force concept that can be implemented as part of an incremental approach is the deployment rotation concept. Just as the Navy only commits two and one half carrier battle groups during peacetime, the Army should establish a baseline number of brigades that it can afford to commit to MOOTW missions without incurring unacceptable risk to the two-MTW strategy. In times of crisis or exigent circumstances, the NCA could always exceed that baseline number, but would hopefully be aware of the risk associated in doing so.

The ACF concept, as presented in this paper, is not considered a viable force structure option. However, certain elements of that concept could be incorporated into an incremental approach to force structure reform. For example, the specialized training that Lieutenant Colonel Adolph and Colonel Snider envisaged for ACF troops could be imparted to infantrymen and others as part of a train-up for specific MOOTW missions. Training in rudimentary language skills, ROE, media relations, culture, and UN procedures could be institutionalized in the Army education system.

A second element of the ACF concept could be incorporated into ongoing efforts to increase the contributions of the NG in MOOTW missions. As an experimental project, the Army could designate a NG Division Headquarters as an ACF Headquarters. As the strategic reserve for the nation, the NG could undertake this experiment at considerably less risk to the overall combat readiness of the Army. The focus on MOOTW would also enhance the NG's applicability to states' needs. The lessons learned in establishing an "ACF style" headquarters could be applied in cases of natural disasters and law enforcement situations. Finally, units in the NG, armed with this training and background, would be more capable of assisting active forces in MOOTW missions.

Elements of the realignment option that are most likely to gain consensus are the proposal to increase the number of MPs in a light division from a company to a battalion and the proposal to give each light division an organic section of CA and PSYOP personnel. When not deployed on missions, these MPs, CA, and PSYOP personnel could train with combat formations to increase their proficiency in MOOTW tasks. In war, these troops would still be invaluable to division and brigade commanders who could use them to liaise with the civilian population and provide rear area security. Also, the proposal to convert a limited number of heavy combat formations to formations with a dual military-civil role is likely to gain acceptance because of the ability of engineers, MPs, and CSS units to provide equal benefit in both state and federal missions.

To summarize, a "compromise" option, composed of elements of each previous option, would consist of the following force structure recommendations:

1. Continue initiatives to make brigades more self-sufficient and deployable with the current division structure (increase modularity).
2. Implement brigade deployment rotation concept similar to the Navy's concept that would signal risk to political decision makers when the force is stretched too thin.
3. Impart ACF-type training to units prior to deployment and institutionalize MOOTW specific training in the Army education system.
4. Establish an ACF headquarters in the ARNG capable of backfilling active forces in the event of a MTW.
5. Increase NG training in MOOTW.
6. Increase the number of MPs in a light division from a company to a battalion.
7. Create additional active duty slots for organic CA and PSYOP personnel and preposition them in regional CINC AORs.
8. Convert a limited number of heavy combat formations in the NG to formations with dual military-civil capabilities--heavy engineers, MPs, and CSS.

Each of the individual measures in this compromise option could be argued on its own merit. The goal of this course of action is to give decision makers a range of options from which to choose. Either as a complete course of action or as individual measures, the "compromise option" is likely to enhance flexibility and reduce OPTEMPO while increasing the probability of political support. This course of action will also ensure a continued ability to maintain combat readiness, prepare for worst case scenarios and comply with strategic guidance.

Summary

A review of the existing literature revealed four broad concepts that have been proposed to help the Army respond to MOOTW missions and MTW scenarios with equal effectiveness. The four concepts are: the medium-weight force concept, the brigade-based force concept, the ACF concept, and the realignment concept. Because the medium-weight option is already under implementation, this chapter analyzed each of the remaining concepts to determine if it would allow units to maintain their combat readiness for major theater war, respond to worst case scenarios envisaged by leading futurists, and comply with strategic guidance from the NCA. The brigade-based force concept and the realignment concept both met these criteria.

Subsequently, each of these two concepts were analyzed to determine which one was preferable based on its ability to become politically viable, reduce OPTEMPO, and enhance flexibility. The brigade-based force concept is the course of action that provides the best opportunity to enhance the Army's ability to conduct MOOTW and MTW with equal effectiveness. However, research indicates that this concept may be too broad and politically contentious to be implemented effectively. For this reason, a range of incremental options was proposed that combined the best ideas from all three options. This range of options provides decision makers with politically viable solutions that could be implemented incrementally. Recognizing that incremental change is often the preferred method of reinvention in large, bureaucratic organizations like the Army, this course of action is perhaps a more feasible and realistic alternative.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The central question of this thesis has been: What force structure options will allow the U.S. Army to enhance its effectiveness in MOOTW while maintaining the unquestioned ability to fight and win two near simultaneous MTWs? While specific recommendations will be offered later in this chapter to answer this primary question, the paper will first attempt to draw conclusions based on the secondary questions posed in chapter 1. These questions were:

1. What is the likelihood that MOOTW missions will continue to play a prominent role in the *NSS*?
2. What is the relevance of optimizing force structure for MOOTW to the civilian leadership's guidance?
3. What are the possible impacts of leading proposals for force structure changes on the Army's ability to perform MTW and MOOTW with equal effectiveness?
4. What lessons do past MOOTW missions hold for future changes in force structure?

Conclusions

MOOTW Will Not Go Away: Of course, no one can predict the future with absolute certainty. However, history, often referred to as the only reliable guide to the future, clearly leads to a belief that MOOTW will continue to play an important role in the *NSS*. The contemporary strategic landscape suggests the same conclusion. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States will, in some cases, be the only country that

can lend the necessary credibility to international peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under the aegis of the United Nations.

Leading futurists, drawing on their understanding and study of history and current trends, predict a world in which Western democracies like the United States must constantly remain vigilant in order to protect their interests against nations hoping to disrupt international order. The implications of predictions by Robert Kaplan, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, and Samuel Huntington are that the military must be prepared to act swiftly to counter asymmetric threats and to regional security and free markets. Based on these prevalent views of future conflict, there will be an almost constant need for forces to conduct MOOTW.

MOOTW Are Not Optional: The *NSS* and the *NMS* make it clear that America's military forces must be able to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. In addition to being able to deter future aggression through military preparedness and the ability to respond to crises, the military must also be able to shape the international environment through a host of peacetime engagement activities, most of which fall under the rubric of MOOTW. The military will also be required to respond to non-military emergencies such as natural disasters and civil disturbances. The Army does not have the luxury of focusing only on MTW or MOOTW; it must be prepared to do both well in order to serve the nation effectively.

Impact of Leading Proposals: First, the medium-weight force concept is well on its way to implementation. While this concept was not intended to address the specific problem of how to enhance effectiveness in MOOTW, it will be able to enhance flexibility and allow the Army more options in responding to SSCs. However, additional

steps are necessary to address the impact of frequent deployments for MOOTW on combat readiness, OPTEMPO, and attendant morale issues.

Second, the brigade-based force concept provides the best holistic option for enhancing effectiveness in MOOTW while retaining combat readiness for MTW. However, this is a revolutionary concept that is unlikely to receive political support from within the Army or from key committees in Congress. Therefore, less controversial aspects of this plan should be studied in an effort to make brigades more deployable and self sufficient within the current division structure. The aspects of this concept that can improve MOOTW effectiveness will be discussed at greater length as specific recommendations.

Third, a broad AC/RC realignment plan provides a second feasible option. This concept would place give active component commanders greater access to military specialties in highest demand for MOOTW. Realignment proposals may offer “win-win” possibilities by allowing NG units to focus on tasks more closely related to their state mission. Increasing the number of CS and CSS units in the Army Reserve would be beneficial in both MTW and MOOTW contingencies. While this plan would enhance flexibility and reduce OPTEMPO, political support for such a broad plan would be problematic

Finally, the ACF concept, as it is currently envisioned, is not a feasible option. The current concept does not allow for a credible combat capability. Also, the concept does not provide the ability to reduce significantly the OPTEMPO burden on combat forces and is likely to create a bifurcated military that would engender jealousy and have a deleterious effect on morale.

Lessons Learned: Recent operations provide valuable insight into the characteristics that are necessary to optimize future forces for effectiveness in MOOTW. First of all, constabulary operations throughout the past century underscore the importance of cross cultural awareness, language capability, and the need for specialized training and doctrine development. In today's force, these skills reside primarily within the SOF community. The implication of this lesson is that the Army needs to continue to invest in SOF and examine ways to integrate them into MOOTW missions to complement conventional forces.

Secondly, the Army needs to avoid ad hoc command relationships when conducting MOOTW. Whenever possible, units should be deployed under the same command they operate under in peacetime. The brigade-based force concept speaks to this issue by proposing measures designed to increase modularity. The concept of increased modularity can be achieved making units more self-sufficient logistically and tailoring force packages that allow units to deploy while maintaining unit integrity.

Third, units need to possess sufficient flexibility to operate with equal skill across the entire spectrum of conflict. In the context of MOOTW, flexibility requires that a unit conducting humanitarian assistance must be able to transition to full-scale offensive operations. In other words, MOOTW forces must be capable of force protection and be able to project a credible deterrent capability.

Finally, the Army needs to do a better job of decreasing OPTEMPO for certain individual units. The example of an overworked, stitched-together infantry battalion cited in chapter 4 should underscore the need for a more enlightened approach to allocating units to MOOTW. Within the context of a revised strategic assessment, a

strong case for “partial mobilization” to enhance MOOTW effectiveness can and should be made.

Given the absence of a peer competitor, the Army may well be able to authorize a reduced readiness for units conducting and recovering from MOOTW (red and amber units under the concept described in chapter 4). It would be difficult to envision a contingency that would require the full mobilization of all units at once to a theater of war. Since strategic lift assets largely drive the deployment of units under the two-MTW scenario anyway, the Army could allow units conducting and recovering from MOOTW to report at a level below C1.

Coupled with efforts to give each brigade its “turn,” this partial mobilization concept would allow for a more equitable allocation of units to MOOTW. Red and amber units would still be responsible for conducting “on deployment” training to maintain their combat skills. Meanwhile, “tip of the spear” and “green” forces could focus solely on combat readiness during their rotation. “Tip of the spear” and green forces would be able to respond to a MTW. Red and amber forces would still be able to respond to a near simultaneous MTW by the time strategic lift assets were available.

Recommendations

To enhance the United States Army’s effectiveness in MOOTW, the following force structure options should be implemented.

1. Continue initiatives to make brigades more self-sufficient and deployable with the current division structure (increase modularity).

2. Implement a brigade deployment rotation concept similar to the Navy's concept that would signal risk to political decision makers when the force is stretched too thin.

3. Impart "ACF" type training to units prior to deployment and institutionalize MOOTW-specific training in the Army education system.

4. Establish an ACF-type headquarters in the ARNG capable of backfilling active forces in the event of a MTW.

5. Increase NG training in MOOTW.

6. Increase the number of MPs in a division from a company to a battalion.

7. Create additional active duty slots for organic CA and PSYOP personnel and preposition them in regional CINC AORs.

8. Convert a limited number of heavy combat formations in the NG to formations with dual military-civil capabilities--heavy engineers, MPs, and CSS.

9. Increase the number of CS and CSS units in the Army Reserve. Specifically, transportation and aviation units would provide invaluable capability for either a MTW or a MOOTW scenario.

Contributions to the Existing Body of Knowledge

This paper has attempted to consolidate the leading positions on force structure options available to enhance effectiveness in MOOTW. By analyzing each one, the paper has been able to combine the more favorable aspects of each option in order to create a range of options for future Army policy makers. Many of the proposals listed above, for example, came from other sources, as is documented in the text. Other options

were created based on insight in the existing literature. Taken in combination, the study provides a more comprehensive set of options than what was previously available.

Furthermore, the paper has reinforced several notions that are not new, but nonetheless bear frequent mention. First, MOOTW missions are not going to go away. As a vital part of the NSS to enhance national security, bolster America's prosperity, and promote democracy abroad, the NCA will expect the Army to participate in MOOTW. Secondly, an analysis of recent trends underscores the importance of identifying viable options for enhancing effectiveness in MOOTW. Finally, any viable force structure option must not endanger the Army's ability to fight and win two near simultaneous MTWs.

Implications for Further Study

This paper identified several topics worthy of further study that are beyond the scope of this paper. First of all, a more comprehensive study of the viability of a modern constabulary force should be conducted to determine if the concept could be refined to address the lack of a credible combat capability and the lack of depth to absorb all possible missions. Secondly, further options available to increase the interoperability of conventional tactical units and SOF forces in MOOTW are an area that ripe for additional study. Finally, doctrine and training development concepts to complement these force structure options should also be studied in greater detail.

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